

## CHAPTER 18

### STABILITY OPERATIONS and SUPPORT OPERATIONS

#### References

FM 3, Operations, 14 June 2001  
FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, 1 July 1993  
FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 December 1990  
FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 30 December 1994  
Appendix III-A to the Theater Logistics Handbook

#### Objectives

- Demonstrate an Understanding of the Types of Stability Operations
- Demonstrate an Understanding of the Types and Forms of Support Operations
- Understand the Difference Between Stability Operations and Support Operations
- Apply the Principles of War to Stability Operations and Support Operations
- Explain the Military role in Stability Operations and Support Operations
- Explain the Principles of Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict
- Demonstrate an understanding of the requirements for logistics support to MOOTW
- Understand the role of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

#### Terms

First it was SMALL WARS then it became LOW INTENSTIY CONFLICT or LIGHT INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC). Then the Army moved to OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW). The JOINT community agreed upon MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW). MOOTW is the term currently in use. With the redesigning of Army doctrine and the conversion of FM 100-5 to FM 3.0, OPERATIONS, new terms and concepts are also being revised and developed. The types of operations the Army will be involved in will consist of OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, STABILITY OPERATIONS, and SUPPORT OPERATIONS. **It is important that you do not confuse STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS with each other. They are two separate and distinct types of missions.**

**STABILITY OPERATIONS** apply military power to influence the political and civil environment, to facilitate diplomacy, and to interrupt specified illegal activities. Its purpose is to deter or thwart aggression; reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies; encourage a weak or faltering government; stabilize a restless area; maintain or restore order; and, enforce agreements and policies. During hostilities, stability helps keep armed conflict from spreading and assist and encourages committed partners. Stability also enables forces to secure support in unstable areas and to prevent civil

populations from interfering in ongoing military operations. Similarly, stability missions may require offensive and defensive actions to destroy rogue forces bent on defeating or stability attempts.

Stability missions may complement and reinforce the offense, defense, and support, or they may themselves constitute the main effort. They may take place before, during, and after offensive, defensive, and support operations. The basic stability missions are peace operations; combating terrorism; counter-drug operations; noncombatant evacuation; arms control; foreign internal defense; security assistance; humanitarian and civic assistance; support to insurgencies; support to counterinsurgencies; and show of force.

**SUPPORT OPERATIONS** provide essential supplies and services to assist designated groups. It relieves suffering and helps civil authorities respond to crises. In most cases, Army forces achieve success by overcoming conditions created by man-made or natural disasters. The ultimate goal of support is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups and to transfer responsibility quickly and efficiently to appropriate civilian authorities. The purpose of support activities, which consist of domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance, are to save lives; reduce suffering; recover essential infrastructure; improve quality of life; and, restore situations to normal.

Domestic support is always conducted in support of local, state, and federal civil authorities. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance is almost always conducted in support of and in concert with other agencies – American and international, government and private. Support missions may be independent, or it may complement the offensive, defensive, or stabilizing operations. The vast majority of operations will likely require complementary support before, during, and after execution.

There are four forms of Support Operations: **Relief Operations, Support to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive consequence response (CBRNE), Support to Civil Law Enforcement, and Community Assistance.**

## **Background**

Stability operations and support operations provide the United States (US) government with an alternative to war. They are not merely the road to war nor a cleaning up afterward. They are a way to achieve national policy objectives without entanglement in an unplanned, undesired, and unnecessary war. They are used in peacetime and in the political-military state of conflict, a middle ground that is neither peace nor war, either because no other means will work or because the values threatened, while important, do not justify the high cost of war.

The US Army does not make policy, but it provides the National Command Authority (NCA) with capabilities from which policy choices can be made. **Not being war, stability operations and support operations are primarily political processes, sometimes accompanied by violence.** Therefore, the role of the Army and the other armed forces is to support the political, economic, and informational instruments of national power. It is those elements of power and the government agencies responsible for them that take decisive action in peace and conflict. Policy matters are very close to the surface in these operations. To support the political process, Army leaders and soldiers of all ranks must understand it. Positive

contributions by the Army are essential to success in these matters. On the other hand, erroneous military actions can be disastrous. The military instrument of national power alone cannot "win" in stability operations and support operations, but it can lose.

In peacetime, the Army's first responsibility is to prepare for war and, through preparation, to contribute to deterrence. In addition, the capabilities developed for war-fighting make the Army useful to the government in peacetime. Leadership, organization, skills, mobility, communications, and equipment designed for war have many peacetime applications. Therefore, the government calls on the Army to aid in natural or man-made disasters at home and abroad. The Army also has a long history of development work within the United States and overseas. These traditional activities, valuable in themselves, help stabilize situations that might otherwise lead to conflict or war.

During times of conflict, the Army provides the necessary security for political, social, and economic actions designed to alleviate its cause. This may require combat, which is defensive at the strategic level and sometimes offensive at the operational and tactical levels. Moreover, the Army can do many kinds of useful work in a violent political-military environment that government civilian agencies cannot.

War is sometimes said to be simple in its concept but complex in its execution. Stability operations and support operations are complex in both concept and execution. Success in peace and conflict requires sophisticated thought. There is no substitute for careful analysis and thorough comprehension. Accordingly, this lesson avoids using checklists and other devices that lead to substituting rote memory for rigorous intellectual application. It does not provide simple answers or even complex answers. It does not tell the reader what to think but what to think about. No two situations leading to stability operations and support operations are alike. Each must be studied and understood for what it is. A course of action must be designed to fit the peculiarities of the situation. This lesson will aid the student in fulfilling these requirements.

## **The Contemporary Situation**

The modern world faces an almost infinite variety of threats to peace. They range from criminality that disrupts civilized life to the Armageddon of nuclear war. Deterring, controlling, and defending against violence across the array of political situations is any government's major responsibility and constant concern. Diplomacy is the first line of defense in international relations. At home, governments rely on police and the courts.

When the international legal order begins to break down and an environment of political violence brings the world to the brink of chaos, the US government must sometimes employ coercion with persuasion to support stability, reassure allies and other friendly countries, and compel adherence to the rule of law. The government begins to use the military, economic, and informational instruments of national power to support diplomacy.

Countries establish armies to fight their wars. Their first responsibility is to support national policies by deterring, engaging, and defeating enemy armies. Capable and ready US military forces deter many potential aggressors. At the same time, the military capabilities developed for warfighting support stability below the threshold of war. The US Army and the other armed forces provide many public services in peacetime,

such as humanitarian assistance at home and abroad and aid to the civil authority in serious domestic disturbances.

## **The Changed Situation**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the restraint of superpower influence on local conflicts has largely disappeared. Local conflicts, long submerged in east-west rivalry, have reemerged in greater number, intensity, and variety of cause. Most of them do not directly affect the interests of the United States. Others affect the U.S. Humanitarian interests in the amelioration of human suffering. Some of these conflicts impinge on United States trade interests, access to markets and materials, the safety of our citizens, and the stability necessary for democratic life. These require a response in the form of stability operations and support operations.

There is a fundamental difference between stability operations and support operations and conventional war. The goal in war is to destroy an enemy's will and capability to fight. Decisive victory in war enables the United States and its allies and coalition partners to demand an outcome consistent with their national interests. By contrast, military stability operations and support operations act as a dampener on political violence, reducing the intensity of conflict and establishing an environment of security conducive to settlement through political, economic, and informational means. In stability operations and support operations, the carefully limited threat or application of force influences the political environment, contributes to suasion, and facilitates diplomacy. In these situations, the equivalent of decisive victory is success at whatever task the government assigns to the Army.

## **The Political-Military Environment**

To understand the Army's role in stability operations and support operations, a review of the political-military environments of peace, conflict, and war described in FM 100-5 is useful. Peace is the state that countries presumably seek. Peace is not totally free of violence, but the violence that exists is not politically directed and organized. In time of peace, the US Army dedicates itself to preparing for war. Its mere existence and activities act as deterrents.

Conflict on the other hand, is distinguished from peace by the introduction of political violence. Conflict is neither peace nor war, at least not as the United States defines war. Conflict is a political struggle in which organized violence serves political and psychological purposes. In the world today violence is a constant factor. In stability operations and support operations, the carefully limited threat or application of force reduces violence, influences the political environment, and facilitates diplomacy.

There are compelling reasons for using the political-military methods of conflict rather than the chiefly military methods of war. First, there are situations in which the methods of war will not work. These include many conflicts within a state, such as insurgencies and separatist movements. In some of these, both sides compete for the loyalty of the same people. They seek to mobilize human and material resources from the same domestic pool. In all of them, their methods deny a conventional force the appropriate targets for its firepower. The combatants are not readily identifiable. They do not wear uniforms. They live, work, and fight among the people. They avoid contact

with their enemy except when conditions are favorable to themselves. Terrorists and drug traffickers use many of the same methods. These situations require a combination of political, economic, informational, and military techniques.

The other reason for using the political-military methods of conflict relates to the inequality of military capabilities. A weak country or political movement cannot hope to defeat a major military power by direct means. It has no choice but to use a combination of means. On the other hand, a large power may find that its interests are challenged but the values at risk do not justify the costs of war. The political-military methods of stability operations and support operations stand a good chance of success and are less costly than conventional war.

## **Application of the Principles of War to Stability Operations and Support Operations**

The principles of war apply to stability operations and support operations in varying degrees. How they fit the situation is determined by the nature of the conflict. When combat is involved, the principles generally apply as in war. They always have to be modified according to the circumstances.

### **Objective**

In stability operations and support operations, the objective is political. Participating Army forces must understand it and adapt their actions to support it. Supporting military objectives must contribute to achieving the desired political end state.

### **Offensive**

Diplomacy or political power takes decisive action in peace and conflict with support from the economic, informational, and military instruments. At the strategic level, military operations are usually defensive. They are intended to protect and assist political, economic, and informational activities. Military forces engage in the offense to accomplish a breakthrough in the political process, such as in peace enforcement, strikes, and raids. The strategic offense may also include military actions intended to seize the initiative without necessarily resorting to violence. These actions include increased states of alert, mobilization of reserves, and strategic deployments. These actions may also make the threat of retaliation more credible. At the tactical level, offensive operations accomplish short-term objectives. They are conducted as in war, but under more restrictive rules of engagement.

### **Mass**

Overwhelming combat power used as a show of force can prevent a potential enemy from mobilizing against US and multinational forces. At the tactical level, mass can bring violence to an end quickly, facilitating the use of political power. Mass may also apply to the application of sufficient political, informational, and economic power to have a decisive effect.

### **Economy of Force**

As in war, military forces in stability operations and support operations use their capabilities in the most effective and economical way. In a strategic sense, most stability operations and support operations constitute an economy of force since they provide an alternative to war for promoting and protecting American national interests.

### **Maneuver**

At the tactical level, maneuver applies in stability operations and support operations as it does in war. At the operational and strategic levels, the psychological aspects of maneuver take on greater importance. For example, in a peacekeeping operation, the timely arrival of the reserve can defuse a dangerous situation.

### **Unity of Command**

While unity of command is always desirable, to achieve it among all the countries and organizations participating in a stability operations and support operation may not be possible. Instead, the participants achieve unity of effort through cooperation, negotiation, and consensus building.

### **Security**

All operations in peace, and many in conflict, tend to create the impression that there is no threat. Army forces may be lulled into complacency. They must always be on guard. Many times, as in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, security is both a political and a physical concept. It is guaranteed by maintaining an impartial and neutral attitude while maintaining the appropriate defensive level.

### **Surprise**

As in warfighting, surprise in stability operations and support operations consists of presenting an opponent with something he does not expect. In stability operations and support operations, this may be an ambush or raid. It may also be a political or an informational initiative that denies the opponent an important issue.

## **Principles of Stability Operations and Support Operations**

Whether in peace or conflict, success in stability operations and support operations is governed by its own principles, which derive from the nature of the endeavor. The most important of these is **primacy of the political instrument of national power**. In operations overseas, the US Department of State usually directs and coordinates the total national effort. Typically, many other agencies of the US and foreign governments are involved in stability operations and support operations. Private organizations also have a major role. Decisive action is in civilian hands, with the armed forces in a secondary and supporting role. Success in stability operations and support operations requires unity of effort among the many participating agencies. Each agency, including the armed forces, must adapt to unfamiliar roles. Every participant must defend its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of those it supports. Patience and perseverance are necessary while persuasion changes political opinions. Restrictions on using force are necessary to prevent escalation to war. Security is required for all

participating organizations, both civilian and military, to execute their responsibilities without interference.

### **Primacy of the Political Instrument**

Military operations in peacetime require little or no force. Even in support of law enforcement, military coercive power is used only to support the police. Law and policy strictly limit the use of the Army in law enforcement. Operations in peacetime use military personnel and materiel to support a civilian agency, which has overall responsibility. It establishes priorities and determines how military resources will be used. The combination of means to be used in peacetime and the role of each is a political decision.

In conflict, the primacy of the political instrument grows out of the intent to solve a problem without war. If success is not to be achieved by defeating an enemy's military power, it must be obtained through political means. Stability operations and support operations use diplomatic, economic, and informational means to change behavior. Military power protects those means and establishes the conditions in which they can function effectively. At times, military operations add a measured amount of coercion to reinforce political means.

Political primacy applies in all kinds of stability operations and support operations. Insurgency is a political process, a competition for loyalty between a government and a competing political faction. Whether the United States supports the government or the insurgents or has a neutral humanitarian interest, it tries to persuade people to change their minds and behavior. Peace operations support diplomacy, the major tool of the political instrument. Security and development assistance furthers political goals. Combating terrorism and counter-drug operations aid law enforcement. Noncombatant evacuation operations support a diplomatic responsibility of the State Department. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have nonmilitary objectives. In all of these and other operations, whether in peace or conflict, the Army supports the execution of national policy. The political instrument of national power dominates every aspect of operations.

The methods of war violate the purpose of stability operations and support operations and are self-defeating. Tactically, this means that large-scale military operations aimed at destroying the enemy's fighting capability should not be used. When violence is required, it should be sufficient to the purpose, but no more than that. Excessive violence undermines the legitimacy of the party that uses it, negating the value of political, economic, and psychological programs.

### **Unity of Effort**

Stability operations and support operations require the combined efforts of all the instruments of national power. Many agencies and armed forces of the United States and friendly foreign governments work together for a common goal. An even larger number of non-government organizations make major contributions. All these organizations must work together, each supporting the others. They must not work at cross-purposes. This requires unity of effort, even when unity of command may not be achievable.

There is precedent for a single directive authority over civilian and military organizations. The Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization of the Vietnam War was a relatively successful grouping of US civilian and military agencies under a single command. However, CORDS was the exception. Usually, unity of effort requires consensus building: direction by committee. When the US effort is part of a multinational coalition, there is even less chance for unity of command. The Army must operate in negotiated coordination with many organizations over which it does not have directive authority.

If the aim is to achieve the national or organizational purpose politically, it follows that the economic, informational, and military elements of power must be used in harmony with that goal. For the United States, this requires single direction by the President and the agency he selects to lead, which will be a civilian agency of government most of the time. Likewise, the efforts of the United States and the country or organization that it supports must be harmonized.

The Army (and the other services and unified commands) must initiate cooperative efforts with participating civilian agencies. It must determine their needs, offer its services, and provide expert advice. It must explain its capabilities and limitations. The Army must accept missions and priorities developed by consensus. Primary coordination will occur at the unified command or joint task force level, but there is scope for negotiated support agreements within policy guidelines even at the lowest tactical levels.

The nature of the conflict demands that the affected country bear primary responsibility for its own defense. Too much American involvement will undermine its legitimacy. This is reflected in the Nixon or Guam Doctrine of 1969, which every subsequent President has endorsed. It says the United States will aid and support its friends and allies, but will not fight their wars for them. If the host nation demonstrates that it is capable, the United States may prefer that it be in overall charge of operations.

### **Adaptability**

The US Army was not designed for stability operations and support operations. It was created to fight and win America's wars, and that is still its primary mission. Especially in peacetime, the additional missions assigned to the Army are outside the scope of its usual interests. To accomplish them, Army leaders must adapt their thinking to unfamiliar purposes and methods. Task organization is only part of adaptability. More important are mental agility to expand the range of operations into unfamiliar realms and the imagination to use Army capabilities for purposes for which they were not originally designed.

Civilian agencies and organizations are not structured to operate in a hostile environment. Likewise, the armed forces are not used to severe restraints on the use of their destructive power. In stability operations and support operations, both must adjust to the environment and its special requirements. The Army must realize its potential for many useful but nontraditional activities to support an integrated national effort. This requires thinking in terms of small, long-term operations using imagination and ingenuity. Each participating organization must accommodate the national and organizational cultures, values, and methods of all the others.

## **Legitimacy**

Legitimacy is used in two related senses. One refers to popular assent to the exercise of government powers by a particular group and in accordance with a particular constitutional method; for example, the theory of the divine right of kings conferred legitimacy on seventeenth-century European monarchs. Confucianism defines legitimacy as the "Mandate of Heaven," evidence that the Divine Power approves the exercise of authority by the people in office. Honest elections legitimize modern governments. The second sense refers to the propriety of particular government actions; for example, US intervention in Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti. This is important to the United States' or other countries' standing in the world community and is often safeguarded by forming coalitions under the United Nations or other auspices.

In either case, legitimacy is the subjective determination that the right people are exercising authority in a proper way for reasonable purposes. It is characterized by the people's habitual obedience of laws and directives. It is important to understand that legitimacy is relative. Some people will always support one contender for power while others support its opponent. Some will transfer loyalty from one to the other or try to remain neutral and above the fray. The balance may change at any time. Gaining and keeping legitimacy is a constant concern of every competitor for power.

Every individual, group, and country makes its own determination of the legitimacy of claimants to authority. Legitimacy is often the center of gravity in stability operations and support operations. Political, economic, psychological, and military actions are all aimed at enhancing one's own legitimacy and undermining that of one's opponent.

Even when the United States has selfless reasons for action, as in disaster relief, people will ask whether it is acting properly or should be acting at all. People are especially wary of armies. The **Posse Comitatus Act** (18 United States Code 1385) reflects a national suspicion of the use of the Army in domestic emergencies. It limits Army participation in law enforcement to matters authorized in the Constitution or specifically by Congress. Whenever armies exercise authority over civilians, people question their legitimacy.

The problem is compounded overseas. There the suspicion of armies is reinforced by suspicion of foreigners. There must be clear consent or other legal basis for US Army participation in operations abroad. In addition, the conduct of all Army personnel must reinforce and protect the legitimacy of their presence and their actions. People will even accept the use of violence for proper purposes when it is proportional to the situation, but any sign of excess can quickly destroy the legitimacy of a force, its government, and the organizations and purposes it is supporting. Likewise, any misbehavior on the part of soldiers, unless promptly discovered and punished, can destroy legitimacy.

Legitimacy is important in every kind of stability operation and support operation. Insurgencies are contests for the right to govern. Each party seeks to enhance its own legitimacy and undermine that of its opponent. The people grant or deny their support according to the way they perceive the legitimacy of the contending parties. In peace operations, the intervening force, whether it is present for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, must demonstrate that it is serving the interests of the people who judge it.

A force engaged in noncombatant evacuation operations, combating terrorism, or counter-drug operations must convince people that it is acting properly with valid authority and with good intentions. Skillful use of information, such as public affairs and psychological operations, can enhance legitimacy, but it depends primarily on correct behavior. This is true of all stability operations and support operations, foreign or domestic, in peace or conflict.

### **Patience and Perseverance**

Success in stability operations and support operations often depends on changing people's attitudes and behavior. That requires persuasion, sometimes aided by a minimum amount of coercion. People have to be convinced. They do not change their minds overnight. Patience also helps limit the level of violence. It aids in avoiding escalation to war. It avoids aggravating the situation by inflicting unnecessary injury and damage. For example, when insurgents or terrorists fire at security forces from among a group of innocent people, it is better to wait and watch than to overreact and cause collateral damage. If terrorists are holding hostages, a security force (police or armed forces) should wait patiently while negotiations seek a resolution. Impatience would risk the safety of the hostages.

Conflict may endure for decades. After more than 40 years, the Israelis and the Arab states are only beginning to reach political accommodation. Many conflict situations are resolved only through major changes in the society, such as South Africa's abandonment of apartheid. Others require long-term economic development. When the United States is engaged in conflict, it must persevere for as long as it takes to reach a political solution. Perseverance is related to restricted use of force. A low level of violence keeps casualties low and makes it possible to stay as long as necessary. The Army should avoid escalation. One way to do that is to keep troop levels low. The congressional-imposed 55-member limit on permanent party military personnel in El Salvador made it possible for the US armed forces to stay there for over a decade. The counterinsurgency effort may have failed if a larger US force had been maintained in the country.

Perseverance is also related to adaptability. Operational objectives must be flexible enough to permit a change of policy when one does not appear to be working. Stubbornly persisting in a failed policy, strategy, or tactic is useless.

### **Restraint**

The intent to solve a problem without conventional war requires restrictions on the use of force. Escalation of violence leads to war and must be avoided. Coercion is only used against people and organizations actively engaged in violence. It must be sufficient to the purpose, but never excessive. Patience should substitute for violence whenever possible. Collateral damage, the unintentional injury or death of persons and destruction of property, destroys legitimacy. It is likely to cause undecided people to join the opposition.

Even coercion against a violent opponent should be minimized. No one should be considered a permanent enemy. Success requires that even the leaders and security forces of an opposing political system must be converted eventually

## **Security**

The environments of peace and conflict can appear benign to soldiers. Especially in peacetime, when their goal is to help others and avoid violence, they may be lulled into complacency. That is when terrorist attacks or other forms of violence are most dangerous. Commanders must be aware of the constant possibility of attacks on soldiers and never allow their soldiers to let down their guard. Force protection is an important command responsibility at all levels.

## **The Military Role in Stability Operations and Support Operations**

FM 3-0, Operations, provides a list of representative Army operations in peace and conflict. This manual adds deterrence to the list because of its priority role in peacetime. The most important thing the Army does in time of peace is to prepare for war. By maintaining a combat-ready force, the Army contributes to deterrence and the prevention of war. The list is not exhaustive and the variety of possible actions is very large. It is limited only by the needs of the country and the imagination of military leaders. The Army has great versatility with many potential applications.

The items are not mutually exclusive. The actions are used in various combinations. Counter-drug operations and counterinsurgency may occur together when drug traffickers attempt to control the actions of government. Support to domestic civil authorities is often necessary in disaster relief.

Many of the actions are useful in two or more of the political-military environments. Combating terrorism is necessary in both conflict and war. Humanitarian assistance and security assistance are useful in peace, conflict, or war. There are many combinations of situations and actions. Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between the operation and the environment or circumstances in which it is executed. Commanders select operations that contribute positively to resolution of the situation at hand.

It must be remembered that in many of these operations the military will not be in charge, nor should it be. The goal is to get in and provide the needed assistance and then get out quickly so that the governmental or other organization (humanitarian, etc.) can run things. The military can run things in the background but it is important that it not be seen as the organization in charge. During Hurricane ANDREW relief operations it was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that was in charge and the military was a supporting organization.

## **Peacetime Activities**

### **US Policy**

The imperfect peace described on page 3, is the realistic goal of most governments. The United States actively uses its influence, including the possibility of force, to protect and promote its interests in this political environment. Actions taken by the United States to secure its interests in this nominally peaceful situation are

sometimes referred to collectively as "peacetime engagement." They reflect a policy of activity in the world community and contrast with a policy of isolationism.

## **Military Operations**

**Deterrence** is a war-related activity that seeks to dissuade a potential enemy from aggression against the United States, its friends, and interests. Deterrence is the art of convincing an opponent that the costs and risks of a course of action outweigh the benefits. This can be accomplished by increasing the perceived cost and risk (deterrence by punishment) or by lowering the perceived benefits (deterrence by denial). Deterrence by punishment usually involves the threat of military or economic sanctions to thwart or punish aggression. It is the primary role of the US armed forces in peacetime. The use of cruise missiles in June 1993 to attack the Iraqi intelligence center in response to the Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush typifies deterrence by punishment. An example of deterrence by denial is the United States policy of "no concessions" toward terrorist demands.

Another war-related activity accomplished in peacetime is **supervision of arms control and disarmament**. It uses military expertise to verify compliance with international agreements. Officers are assigned to interagency committees under State Department leadership to certify the destruction or other disposition of weapons and equipment.

**Disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and aid to civil authority** represent practical uses of Army resources in peacetime. The leadership, organization, training, and equipment that the Army has developed for war give it great capability to aid people in need, either at home or abroad. Rapid response in times of crisis is an Army tradition as long as its history. Examples are Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Los Angeles riots the same year, the floods in the Midwest of 1993, the San Francisco and Los Angeles earthquakes, and recurring forest fires, storms, and other catastrophes. When Army forces are used in these roles, the major commands must consider the effect on combat readiness. They should rotate these missions among units and provide them the opportunity to retrain to war-fighting standards.

**Foreign Internal Defense** employs the capabilities of the US and other armies in political, social, and economic development as part of a broad foreign policy program. The resources of the US Army and its foreign counterparts have great utility in the development of a country's political, social, and economic infrastructure. Nation assistance is directed at improving the capabilities of the civilian sector of a foreign country. Development is a sufficient end in itself, but it also serves to prevent internal and external conflicts by alleviating some of their causes. The US Army participates in nation assistance by employing its resources in coordination with the Agency for International Development. It also influences the participation of foreign armies in the development of their own countries by enhancing their capabilities and encouraging their sense of public service. Commanders must be wary of expecting more from nation assistance than it can deliver. This is a military program in support of the recipient nation conducted under the leadership of other agencies of the US government. It is important and useful, but it is not a total solution to another country's problems.

**Foreign humanitarian assistance** programs relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger,

or deprivation that might present a serious threat to life or result in great property damage or loss. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. It is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Most foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted as joint or multinational operations. The most common operations are disaster relief and refugee programs. The US Coast Guard and Navy rescued thousands of Cubans and Haitians from the seas. In Operation Safe Haven in Panama and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the US Army and Marine Corps then cared for the refugees. Detailed multi-service procedures are provided in FM 100-23-2.

**Security assistance** has both peace- and war-related applications. This is a group of programs to improve the capabilities of foreign military forces through material transfer, funding, and education and training. Security assistance can help the recipient stabilize the peace, ameliorate conflict, and prepare for war.

## Domestic Support

Active duty military support to civilian agencies is one of the few instances where requests for federal government assistance starts at the local level and continues through the state authorities to the highest levels of government. Local governments have the primary responsibility to respond to domestic emergencies. If the scope of the situation grows beyond the capabilities of the private and local level, they will request state assistance. **Only when state and local government resources are exhausted or deemed totally inadequate to the situation will federal support be sought or provided.** Federal assistance is designed only to supplement local and state governments and relief organizations.

The Army gets involved in **four primary domestic support operations: Community Assistance; Support to Law Enforcement; Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive consequence response (CBRNE), and Relief Operations.** An additional area the Army has gained more involvement with is in counter-drug operations.

In **domestic support operations**, the National Guard, acting under the command of the governor, has the **primary** responsibility for providing military assistance. As a result of the National Guard's dual status, the legal status of its members when training or performing duty as the National Guard of the state is quite different than when training or performing duty as the National Guard of the United States, which is its status as a reserve component of the Army or Air Force. The most notable difference arises when the National Guard is employed in state status to assist state and local law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances and counter-drug missions. **When not in federal status, the National Guard is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) and other restrictions that apply to federal forces.** This means that the National Guard should not be federalized for domestic actions unless absolutely necessary because that action unduly restricts how it can be used.

1992 Los Angeles Riot

While in state status, the California Army National Guard accepted 100 percent of the support missions requested. After federalization, only 10 percent of the missions could be accepted because of Posse Comitatus limitations.

The active Army and Air Force and their reserves are prohibited from law enforcement duties except as authorized by the Constitution. DoD policy extends this prohibition to the Navy and Marine Corps. Because of Posse Comitatus limitations, the Army and federalized California Army National Guard could not fulfill the majority of requests for assistance during the LA riots of 1992. Their inability led directly to the decision not to federalize the Florida Army National Guard during the disaster relief effort for Hurricane Andrew. This allowed continued assistance to local authorities.

#### US Army Reserve

During the Big Thompson Canyon Flood of 1976, members of CO B, 244 EN BN (CBT) (HVY) (USAR) volunteered as individuals, without pay, to assist the Colorado Army National Guard in rescue operations.

Once the President has declared either a federal emergency or major disaster, the **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the executive agency responsible for delivering federal aid and assistance to the states and coordinating federal assistance.** If federal military assistance is required, the Secretary of the Army serves as the executive agent for the Department of Defense. The Secretary will issue an executive order to the appropriate combatant commander designating supporting combatant commanders, services, agencies, and command relationships. During these operations, the military supplements rather than replaces civil agency responsibilities.

When the emergency situation is sufficient to justify using federal forces, the National Guard will already have units deployed as part of the state response. Liaison and coordination with the National Guard will facilitate deploying the federal forces efficiently. Because of the legal restrictions on the missions that federal troops can perform, it is advantageous to have the National Guard remain in either state or Title 32 status. This allows them to conduct security missions and other direct support to law enforcement while federal forces concentrate on CSS operations. This proved successful during the response to Hurricane Andrew in Florida. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, provides detailed information on this topic.

### Support to Civil Law Enforcement

Within the confines of the United States, the Army is extremely limited in the types of missions and operations it can undertake, barring a declaration of martial law. In its role as the state militia, the National Guard has the primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local authorities. When permitted by law, federal operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities. The Army has aided in quelling civil unrest in Washington, DC, and Los Angeles. Before lending support to civil law enforcement, commanders must obtain legal advice from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).

Before 1986, the only mandated military role in counter-drug operations was reducing demand within the Services' own ranks. That remains the priority. The National Drug Control Strategy stresses the importance of demand reduction for the country as a whole. It prescribes a program of education, prevention, treatment, research, and rehabilitation. The Army has had such programs for its own troops for years and will continue them. Protecting the force from infestation by drugs is an extension of every commander's force protection responsibilities.

In the counter-drug campaign, recent legislation has funded and allowed specified activities for both federal and state forces. A more active military role in providing support to drug law enforcement agencies in their counter-drug operations began with **National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 in 1986**. It was expanded by the **National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989**.

In the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DoD to support drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) in the following ways:

- *Serve as lead for detecting and monitoring air and maritime transit of illegal drugs.*
- *Integrate those command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) assets of the federal government dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network.*
- *Approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard (NG) in support of DLEA counter-drug interdiction and enforcement operations.*

In 1994, \$12.1 billion was spent on federal counter-drug efforts. Of this, \$800 million was the DoD effort.

In direct support to the police department (PD), the Puerto Rican National Guard has an ongoing state mission to support the state police.
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Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Counter-drug Operations, contains details of the legal authority, the national organization for drug control, and the roles and missions of the various government agencies. It leaves no doubt that counter-drug operations, like other stability operations and support operations, are joint, combined, and interagency by their very nature. The requirements for success in stability operations and support operations, described above, apply equally in counter-drug operations.

## Peace Operations

Peace operations intend to solve political problems without resorting to war. They may take place when a breach of the peace is threatened or when political violence occurs. The United Nations Charter specifically addresses peaceful resolution of disputes and breaches of the peace among nations. However, the United Nations and other organizations have also applied peace operations in internal disputes and may do so again in the future.

Peace operations are not primarily military operations. They are political processes with military support. Military forces make important contributions to the process, but military personnel should never forget the essential political nature of these

operations and the subordinate, supporting role of the armed forces. Peace operations are known by many different names, but they consist of three basic types: **peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and operations in support of domestic efforts.**

In **peacekeeping**, military forces and observers are used with the consent of the belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce and promote conditions that support diplomatic efforts. These operations are sometimes described as "truce keeping." Peacekeeping forces and observers assure each party to a truce that the other is not violating its terms in preparation for resuming hostilities. Peacekeeping operations cannot solve the political problem; they only aid the diplomatic process. Consent of the belligerents is a necessary condition of peacekeeping. Consent distinguishes peacekeeping from other types of peace operations.

**Peace enforcement** goes beyond peacekeeping and combines coercive measures with diplomacy to compel the belligerents to stop fighting and initiate negotiations. In peace enforcement, the force conducting the operation does not have the consent of all the belligerents and is seeking to make them do things they do not want to do. This difference has important implications for the way the force must operate to accomplish its mission and provide for its own security.

**Operations in support of diplomatic efforts** is made up of three types of operations: Peace making, peace building, and preventive diplomacy.

The United Nations uses the term **peacemaking** to describe the political process to resolve disputes. It consists of diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, judicial process, and good offices. The Army usually is not directly involved, but supportive Army operations contribute to the peacemaking process.

**Peace building** establishes and strengthens political and social institutions for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Peace building may work before a conflict erupts into violence or after a cease-fire. An example is the establishment of a Palestinian police force in the Gaza Strip and Jericho to maintain order after a negotiated withdrawal of the Israeli army. These operations also include political, economic, and social infrastructure development in which the Army may engage under the title nation assistance. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate short-term hardships may also aid in peace building.

**Preventive diplomacy** is a show of force to demonstrate international resolve to solve the conflict by military means. They may be small, symbolic demonstrations or major deployments with significant combat capabilities. In either case, the intent is that demonstration of military power can and will serve as an aid to diplomacy and that the forces not engage in combat.

These operations occur in various combinations. None of the military operations can succeed unless the diplomatic process of peacemaking succeeds. This part of the lesson deals mainly with peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the two types of operations with significant military participation.

## **Authority**

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Neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement is specifically authorized in the United Nations Charter. Rather, the authority is inferred from Chapters VI and VII of the charter. Article 33 of Chapter VI, Peaceful Resolution of Disputes, obligates parties to a dispute to "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." The same article empowers the Security Council to "call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." If peacekeeping is a "call" by the Security Council, peace enforcement is a "shout."

## **Rules of Engagement**

Rules of engagement (ROE) are used in both Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement operations. They specify the conditions under which weapons may be carried, quantities of ammunition to be carried, and the circumstances under which deadly force can be used. The guiding principle is that violence is used only in self-defense and, even then, is kept to the minimum necessary for the purpose. The rules of engagement may also prescribe procedures for accounting for weapons and ammunition and the ways for using various types of weapons. They may direct the conduct of investigations when deadly force is used. US contingent commanders must be alert to the possibility that other national contingents may interpret the ROE differently than they do. They must use their influence to standardize application of the ROE and to guard against any adverse effects of different interpretations.

## **Peacekeeping**

**Peacekeeping is a military operation conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution of the underlying political disagreements.** The United States may participate in peacekeeping operations **under the auspices of an international organization, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally.**

Peacekeeping requires all a soldier's professional skills, plus patience, determination, and good humor. It entails a certain amount of danger and hardships. However, it also contributes positively to a more peaceful world. A famous quotation is usually attributed to the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."

## **Peacekeeping Forces**

Peacekeeping forces consist of an international military headquarters, intermediate headquarters as required, support units, and combat units assigned to a peacekeeping role. The combat units are usually battalion size. The United States does not organize specific units for peacekeeping operation. Instead, maneuver battalions are task-organized for the mission.

Peacekeeping forces man fixed observation posts, conduct patrols, and maintain a contingency force. They supervise and assist the belligerents in accomplishing peace-enhancing objectives such as withdrawal and disengagement, prisoner-of-war exchanges, and demilitarization and demobilization.

## **Command and Control**

All the Army's soldiers, down to the lowest rank, must understand the general principles of peacekeeping and the way a force is organized and directed. Just as they must understand their chain of command in ordinary military operations, they must also understand the basis of authority in a peacekeeping mission.

Peacekeeping operations are usually organized and directed by an international authority, such as the United Nations. Regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity or the Organization of American States also conduct peacekeeping. A unilateral American peacekeeping operation is possible but unlikely. Multinational efforts (MFO Sinai) are more acceptable, are effective, and increase the legitimacy of the operation.

### **US National Command Channels**

Each national contingent maintains its own chain of command. The National Command Authorities make the decision for US forces to participate in a peacekeeping operation. The US Department of State has overall responsibility for planning and executing peacekeeping operations. The Department of State forwards requests for military support to DoD, which assigns the mission to either a combatant commander (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) or an "executive agent" to provide troops and carry out the mission. The Secretary of the Army has acted as executive agent in the past.

Although several alternative command and control arrangements are possible, the principle is clear. One international force commander is responsible for the operations of the peacekeeping force, and one authority in the United States Armed Forces provides the necessary support to participating US forces.

### **Types of Command Arrangements**

US military forces conducting peace operations may do so as part of a unilateral US operation or as part of a multinational force led by the US or another nation. The command arrangement of US forces committed to a unilateral or multinational peace operation varies with the type of operation, the level of US involvement, and the nature of the international organization charged with the operation. The following examples represent possible command arrangements.

#### **Unilateral US Operation**

- US acts alone
- Responds only to the President and Secretary of Defense

#### **Multinational Operation US as Lead Nation**

- US leads operation
- Mandate from international organization
- Report to international organization, the US President, and Secretary of Defense

## **Multinational Operation US in Support**

- US is not lead nation
- US contribution may be combat or logistics
- Mandate from international organization
- US reports to the international organization, the US President, and Secretary of Defense

## **Force Structure**

The structure of the peacekeeping forces is based on METT-TC, as modified by political considerations. Ultimately, force structure is a political decision and is described in the Terms of Reference (TOR). The conditions likely to produce renewed violence and its potential level assist in determining appropriate force design. The structure of a peacekeeping force can range from military police and light infantry to armored cavalry, mechanized, or armor formations. Aviation may be required for both combat and support functions. Administrative and logistics support to US and other national contingents is provided in accordance with agreements. In some cases, the peacekeeping force may be structured to exercise police functions. If an air threat exists, air defense units may be required. When structuring forces, planners must also provide for civil affairs capabilities and language-proficient individuals.

## **Logistics and Interoperability**

**Logistics is the responsibility of the international military peacekeeping command.** However, in a peacekeeping force's early stages, national contingents may have to provide for their own support. One solution to the logistics problem is for a **single country to provide the support for the entire force.** The United States does this for the MFO. It eliminates some of the problems that arise from the incompatibility of equipment in various armies.

Another solution involves **using commercially available equipment** instead of military specification items. Instead of using high mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), the MFO uses a commercially available sport utility vehicle. This simplifies maintenance since parts are widely available, and local contractors often can maintain such vehicles.

Many other **contracted supplies and services** can also be put to good use. However, over dependence on one of the parties may give the appearance of partiality. For example, the MFO is careful to purchase roughly equal values of goods and services from Egypt and Israel. Quality control may also be a problem, especially in Third World countries. For example, medical personnel must be vigilant to ensure the quality of food and water. Some of the problems of balance and quality control may be overcome by contract purchase from third countries. Because contracted goods and services are so important to a peacekeeping force, purchasing and contracting officers should deploy with the first groups of personnel.

Another way to overcome the problem of incompatible equipment is to **assign specific functions to a single national contingent**. Again, the MFO serves as an example. France has provided aviation support; Uruguay, ground transportation and engineering; and The Netherlands, signal and military police support.

## Peace Enforcement

International experience of peace enforcement is limited. It has been made to work, such as in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The preponderance of American force over the small belligerent parties made it possible for the United States to make them stop fighting. During colonial times, the imperial powers often had sufficient military superiority to compel their subjects to stop fighting. When forces with significant military capability are involved, this may be impossible. The peace enforcement organization must generate enough visible combat power that the belligerents recognize the futility of opposition. The belligerents must also recognize the impartiality of the PE force. Without this recognition, the mission will fail. The Dominican Republic intervention was successful because the force treated all sides fairly. However, the whole concept implies a rational response from the belligerents. That is far from guaranteed. If the attempt to coerce the belligerents to stop the hostilities fails, and a reliance on the political process also fails, the sponsoring international organization has a difficult choice to make. It must then either go to war or abandon its goals.

Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities. Peace enforcement helps resolve disputes by peaceful means. It combines minimum coercion with maximum persuasion to compel the belligerents to stop fighting and begin talking. **Peace enforcement is used when the belligerents do not consent to peacekeeping.**

Peace enforcement requires a credible military capability. Even though the intent is to avoid violence, the force must include the whole spectrum of combat power. The show and demonstration of force must be sufficient to convince the belligerents that they must take the international policy seriously. The belligerents must understand that they cannot afford to disregard the intervening force and its directives.

Peace enforcement is most likely to be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. A regional organization of states might also undertake such a mission. Less likely, the United States might do so unilaterally. Whatever the sponsoring organization, peace enforcement requires a complete integration of the military and diplomatic functions, with the latter exercising overall control. Command and control arrangements are further complicated by the international makeup of the force. As in more familiar consensual peacekeeping missions, the political council of the sponsoring organization, for example the UN Security Council, must direct the peace enforcement. It also requires a military peace enforcement command to carry out military actions. Unlike a peacekeeping force, however, this command must also include diplomatic officials to execute the political function as it arises in the course of military operations. It must have a direct line of communications with the political council. Political representation should extend downward at least to the battalion level.

A military organization engaged in peace enforcement may have to employ violence. Yet, it must use great restraint, always offering the party a peaceful means of resolution. The intervening force must be prepared at all times to defend itself against hostile action by any of the parties. If things go wrong, it could find itself at war with any or all of the belligerents. If the peace enforcers become entangled in war, they have failed in their mission.

## Chapter 18: Stability operations and support operations

### Homework Assignment

Manuals Required to Complete Homework: Theater Logistics Handbook, FM 100-5, FM 100-19, FM 100-23 and Theater Log Handbook Appendix "C".

1. List and define the difference between Stability Operations and Support Operations: FM 3-0.

Stability:

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Support:

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2. List and describe briefly some of the principles of war as applied to Stability Operations and Support Operations (operations other than war). Ref: FM 3-0

Objective:

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Offensive:

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Mass:

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Economy of Force:

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Maneuver:

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Unity of Command:

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Security:

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Surprise:

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3. List and describe the seven principles associated with Stability Operations and Support Operations (military operations other than war). Ref: FM 3-0

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4. List the primary categories of domestic support. Ref: FM 100-19

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5. Who is primarily responsible for providing military assistance to state and local governments and what is the Army's role when State and National Guard resources need supplementation? Ref: FM 100-19

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6. Describe what FEMA is and the basic responsibility of the agency. Ref: FM 100-19

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7. List and describe the four main sources of logistical support for peace operations.  
Ref: FM 100-23

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8. List the three types of peace operations: Ref: FM 3.0

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9. List and briefly describe the two types of support missions. Ref: FM 3-0.

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10. Explain the three types of command arrangements. Include information about the reporting channels in each. Ref: FM 100-23

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11. List and briefly explain the Principles of Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict. Ref: FM 100-23

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12. The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is defined as \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_. Ref: Theater Log

Handbook Appendix III-A

13. Only one CMOC will be established for every operation. Ref: Theater Log Handbook Appendix III-A

\_\_\_\_\_ True

\_\_\_\_\_ False

14. List the five major functions of the CMOC. Ref: Theater Log Handbook Appendix III-A

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