From day one, soldiers are taught that their highest priority in any mission is security. The recent Army operation in Haiti required soldiers to pay constant attention to detail. But the daily monotony of their routine duties and growing familiarity with their surroundings tempted soldiers to let their guard down and become complacent. Leaders at all levels had to monitor their troops continuously and remind them that, while there was no combat threat, there was an element of danger in their mission. The key to maintaining security in Haiti was a good brigade support area (BSA) defense plan.
I was S2/3 of the 10th Forward Support Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), at Fort Drum, New York. When we deployed to Haiti, we occupied the port facility in Cap-Haitien, a city on Haiti's north shore. We initially occupied the site with a special Marine ground task force (MAGTAF). The Marines did not plan to remain in Cap-Haitien for long, so their defense plan was simple: a single strand of concertina wire combined with an overpowering show of force. However, this technique would not work for defending our BSA. We didn't have the number of soldiers or the firepower of the MAGTAF.
Our collocation with the Marines lasted for approximately 2 weeks, which gave us time to develop a working defensive plan. The Cap-Haitien port facility was a small piece of land surrounded by water on three sides (north, east, and south). The shoreline was edged with large boulders that made installing concertina wire very difficult. A wall bordered the port facility on its west side and continued around the north shore about 30 feet off the shoreline. A pier extended off the south shore, and several hardstand structures were located within the port facility.
Controlling Local Access
Our most difficult task in establishing a BSA defense was controlling local nationals who worked at the port. We first had to set a limit on the access of these workers to the port facility. We decided that an existing road that separated the pier from the rest of the port facility would be the access boundary: Haitians would be permitted access to the pier, but they would be allowed to work within the BSA across the road only under the supervision of an armed guard.
To create the boundary, we ran triple-strand concertina wire along the road. This was not accomplished easily. To get the concertina to stay in place, we drove the pickets into an existing drainage-cover grate that ran the entire length of the road. The pickets were then tied off to the grate. Stakes were driven into the road surface, and the concertina was secured to the stakes. We also constructed two guard posts at designated breaks in the concertina barrier, at the exit and entrance to a service road. These guard posts controlled local access as well as the flow of traffic into and out of the BSA.
Our next task was to install concertina along the north and east shorelines. We had to do this in order to control local nationals who docked their boats on the rocks and tried to come ashore. Once again, securing the concertina was not an easy task. We had to employ methods like those we used along the road, except that we added a triple row of barbed-wire tanglefoot along the shore. However, the concertina-and-barbed-wire barrier didn't stop the Haitians; it only slowed them down enough for soldiers from the quick reaction force (QRF) to get to the location of the breach.
QRF, MILVAN's, and Roving Patrols
The QRF is always an important factor in protecting a BSA. The soldiers located in a BSA are generally from a forward support battalion, and their primary job is to provide logistics support to a brigade. They can't always spend a lot of time on the perimeter pulling guard duty. To ease demands on the logisticians, a QRF is employed. The role of a QRF is to respond to any BSA security breach that a normal roving force or guard position can't handle. The QRF that we used in Cap-Haitien was comprised of three teams. The BSA was divided into three sections, and each QRF team was responsible for a section.
We constructed fighting positions along the inside of the wall on the west side of the port facility. Several fighting positions were designated and built within the port facility as secondary fighting positions, and key personnel were identified to occupy them.
We also built fighting positions atop several structures within the port facility. These positions were manned with crew-served weapons at times of increased security demands. Each had a specific field of fire. This particular position was designed for an M2 .50-caliber machinegun and afforded an excellent view of the northeastern part of the city of Cap-Haitien. Along the wall and outer perimeter, we built five guard towers using the MILVAN's with which we deployed. The MILVAN's provided an excellent base for guard towers.
Security along the pier was a major concern, because the reverse-osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU) was set up there and was somewhat isolated from the rest of the BSA. After several weeks during which the soldiers of the water team maintained their own security from the Haitians working on the pier, we built them a MILVAN wall. This wall provided security, made the pier easier to defend, and kept the Haitians working on the pier from getting near the ROWPU.
The last measure used in the defense of the BSA was roving patrols. There were five patrols of two or three men each, and they walked the entire perimeter of the BSA nightly. The roving patrols were used to monitor activities outside the BSA and to alert the QRF when necessary.
Convoy Security
The situation in Cap-Haitien required BSA tenant units to pick up supplies at the Cap-Haitien airfield, which was 6 miles by road from the port facility. This requirement meant that we needed to use convoys for resupply and pay attention to convoy security. The BSA standing operating procedure called for each convoy to consist of no fewer than three vehicles. Two convoy vehicles were designated as "gun ships" for security; all other convoy vehicles were used for cargo pickup or delivery.
Each of the two "gun ship" vehicles in a convoy was manned by five soldiers: the vehicle commander, a driver, two soldiers to operate a crew-served weapon, and one additional soldier for security. All vehicles used for transporting supplies were required to have a vehicle commander and driver. So the minimum number of personnel required for a minimum 3-vehicle convoy was 12.
These manning requirements soon taxed our available personnel. We quickly determined that using the same vehicles and personnel on a daily basis was more effective than routinely switching them. Using the same personnel also had intelligence benefits: the soldiers could observe the local nationals and monitor the local scene outside the BSA on a daily basis and recognize if anything was out of the ordinary. However, we were required to rotate some personnel on occasion.
We also had to designate a convoy commander for each convoy. Besides supervising the convoy, the convoy commander was responsible for two other key tasks: ensuring that each member of the convoy was given a convoy safety briefing, and presenting a convoy debrief to the battalion S2.
A debrief was given to the S2 whenever a convoy was sent to a new location and on a routine basis for established convoy routes. The information gathered from the debrief would be used to alert personnel to any trouble or dangers encountered or suspected along a new route and any changes along known routes. This information was passed through S2 channels to the brigade S2. Convoy security in Haiti did not present a threat to any member of the battalion. However, there were a few occasions when Haitians in the streets broke contact between convoy vehicles; a major effort then was needed to link the split convoy together again.
The need for major defensive resistance within the BSA did not materialize, but the need to be prepared never diminished and the requirement for security and safety was never downplayed. Within 72 hours of our deployment, the foundation of BSA defense was in place. Improvements continued until the day the battalion redeployed. If the need had arisen, we were confident that the BSA could have defended itself. ALOG
Captain Robert A. Elmore is the commander of B Company, 10th Forward Support Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York. He is a graduate of Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania and the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course.