As we move into the 21st century, contractors are being used increasingly in forward positions. The author discusses the impact on commanders who find themselves responsible for contractor personnel as well as soldiers.
How will logistics support be provided in the future to enhance the performance of Force XXI and the Army After Next (AAN)? As our military forces move into the next century, continuing and projected budget cuts will require further force reductions. The primary approach is to cut our forces mainly in the "tail" (the support structure) and only minimally in the "tooth" (the combat structure). Furthermore, the ongoing transition from a forward-deployed force to one that is primarily based in the continental United States shifts the priority for force projection in favor of the warfighter. These changes affect not only how our forces will fight in the future but also how we will support them on the battlefield.
To decrease our tooth-to-tail ratio, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have targeted the ever-increasing support and infrastructure costs that historically have consumed over half of our defense budget. Unmistakably, the result of this approach will be a growing logistics shortfall. One way to fill the void left by the downsizing of our logistics forces is to use contractors on the battlefield. Contractors will not replace our force structure, but they will augment the Army's capabilities and provide an additional option for meeting support requirements.
The concept of using contractors as force multipliers is not new, but the degree to which we plan future use of contractors is increasing steadily. Previously, contractors were used primarily in a rear area support role. Can we successfully anticipate and plan for potential complications connected with the forward deployment of contractors?
The consequences of using contractors on the battlefield go beyond the impact on the armed forces that are required to protect them during hostilities. It also affects the commanders, their planning staffs, and their risk assessment procedures.
Because the Army has taken the largest share of personnel cuts among the armed services and has seen a substantial increase in peacekeeping missions, it finds itself relying heavily on civilian support. As a result, planners and commanders have to manage additional planning requirements. When planning for a military mission, commanders now must consider and anticipate the support requirements of contractor personnel. Planners must address the issue of protection and security of contractors and their equipment. Therefore, they must use the risk of hostilities as a basis for determining whether or not to provide security. Commanders can recommend not using contractors if the risk of hostilities is high.
Types of Contractors
The Army normally uses two types of contractors on the battlefield: system and contingency.
System contractors are involved in the manufacture and life-cycle management of major systems, such as vehicles, weapons, and aircraft. They provide technical and maintenance support during peacetime and wartime for the systems they produced. The logistics support element monitors the performance of these contractors. One example of this type of support is the 1997 proposal for a Prime Vendor support arrangement for the Apache helicopter with Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The Boeing-Lockheed Martin program would transfer responsibility for complete wholesale support of the Apache to the contractor-operated Team Apache System. The Team Apache System currently is undergoing testing. Contract terms providing specifics for battlefield support of critical systems are still under review.
Contingency contractors provide support primarily during contingencies. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), they provide supplies and services in support of Army forces during operations. These contractors may include host nation, third country, or U.S. contractors. The elements responsible for contract management and the contracting officer control contingency contractors. These contractors fall into two subcategories, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and operation-specific contracts.
LOGCAP is an Army program. It is used primarily in areas where no multilateral or bilateral agreements exist. However, host nation support agreements usually will be in place. LOGCAP does not replace force structure.
Operation-specific contracts are negotiated after planning has begun for a specific contingency. They are arranged in theater during pre-deployment or deployment to ensure support when the main force arrives. This type of contract must be integrated into the overall support plan.
Role of the Contractor on the Battlefield
Analysts argue that using contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers is one way to decrease costs. However, associated risks must be analyzed responsibly to determine second- and third-order effects on the mission. Contractors can provide substantial combat service support and some combat support on the battlefield. These functions include, but are not limited to, maintenance and transportation support.
Maintenance support. System contractors usually perform sustainment maintenance on a case-by-case basis. These contracts encompass peacetime and wartime and cover specific weapon systems and subsystems. System contracts will require the contractor to be present on the battlefield and work directly with soldiers.
The contingency contractor can provide field services, such as laundry, bath facilities, and clothing repair, and base-operations support to deployed military forces in an austere environment, which includes construction and real estate management and maintenance.
Transportation support. System contractors have a limited role in this area. Transportation support in peacetime and wartime will be provided as a part of Prime Vendor support. METT-TC permitting, contingency contractors can perform selected mode and terminal operation functions to augment Army transportation units.
Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard, and Joint Forge in Bosnia-Herzegovina recently benefited from contracted logistics support provided through LOGCAP. LOGCAP was one of the tools available to support base camp logistics operations. The original contract was awarded to Brown & Root Services Corporation (BRSC). On 26 November 1995, the BRSC contract was activated to provide an intermediate staging base at Kaposvar and Taszar, Hungary. BRSC deployed about 1,000 employees to the region. Their mission was to support U.S. troops serving in Bosnia, Hungary, and Croatia. BRSC personnel, along with 5,500 locals, built 33 camps and provided cooking, laundry, sanitation, and some mail services.
Since the Army awarded a contract to BRSC for logistics services in 1992, Brown & Root employees have become a familiar sight for military troops in the field. In 1997, the original contract awarded to BRSC came up for renewal. Following a competition, DynCorp was awarded the contract under the management of the Army Materiel Command. BRSC won the contract again this year.
Impact on the Armed Forces
The experience with a contractor work force in Bosnia has been good for the most part. Augmenting logistics support with LOGCAP contractors has allowed the military to focus on its primary mission. Commanders on the ground have not had to worry about or plan directly for field service support. This has freed up military personnel for their primary mission requirements.
There are times when the use of contractor personnel affects the commander's planning and mission focus. A contract condition can require the deployed forces to provide security for the contractor work force and their equipment. In that case, operational commanders must consider additional security requirements in their planning process. This can be difficult to execute, especially since the tactical footprint will be small at the start and end of an operation. Aside from the planning requirements, the commander also may have to give up soldiers to augment the additional security mission.
Where contractor personnel locate in a theater and how they move can have an impact on the military forces they support. Commanders must conduct risk assessments to determine if contractor support is suitable. The risk assessment should cover the situation, location, potential for hostilities, risk to mission accomplishment, risk to contractor personnel, and cost of the contract during peacetime and wartime.
The commander also must be prepared to react if the contractor is unwilling to provide services in a war zone. As stated in the Congressional Record in 1984, "Although contractor personnel have historically been willing to go into a war zone to work and have proven to be reliable, there is still no assurance that essential civilians hired to serve in peacetime would be willing to remain in a potential war zone should a conflict actually start." Since the risk associated with forward deployment of contractor personnel is not evaluated easily, commanders only can predict potential problems.
One area of potential risk is the legality of having noncombatants in a combat zone. Contractors providing essential services are expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such services according to the terms and conditions of the contract during periods of crisis until appropriately released or evacuated by military authority. To be relieved of the responsibility, civilian contractors simply have to resign their positions. Unless a formal declaration of war has been issued, the commander has no recourse.
What does that mean to the commander? The loss of a mission-essential contractor potentially can degrade mission accomplishment and endanger soldiers. In anticipation of the potential departure of mission-essential contractor personnel, leaders must have a workable contingency plan and must be prepared to divert warfighters to a support mission until the contingency plan can be implemented.
Command and Control
Controlling civilian contractor personnel on the battlefield presents a challenge for the commander. According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 715-16, Contractor Deployment Guide, contractor personnel who support U.S. forces during a declared war are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Outside a declaration of war, they do not fall under the UCMJ.
Another area of consideration is the status of contractor personnel providing support in foreign countries. Contractor personnel will be subject to Federal, host nation, and international laws, laws of war, and status of forces agreements, yet direct supervision resides with the contractor. However, this does not deprive the commanders completely of control. They can exercise indirect control through contract terms and conditions and by attachment (with special reporting procedures) to a specific military unit. The commander can direct such a unit to provide administrative accountability, and contractor personnel can be required by the contract to follow all guidelines and instructions issued by the commander.
Since direct supervisory authority for contractor personnel resides with the contractor, the commander can exercise only indirect command and control. As a result, commanders are faced with potential disruption of the mission and security in the area of operations (AO). Primarily, contractors are responsible for disciplining their work force. The commander's alternatives include withdrawal of facility access, revocation of employment status, and removal from the AO. For the military commander, civilian contractors can cause disciplinary problems in the AO. Military personnel work well in a structured environment where rank matters on and off duty; for civilians, this can be a shock.
Military Support to the Contractor
Since contractors will live and work in the field environment, the Army must provide certain support services. These services will be especially necessary during the initial deployment phase. When the contractor enters the theater with the military units, the contractor staff will work with the soldiers to establish theater support operations.
Since the theater commander is responsible for the security and support of the contractor cell, the military support plan must include requirements for supporting them. As a minimum, the commander must plan to provide field service support, protection from enemy action, individual weapons, and training in basic military skills. Having to support the contractor work force places additional logistics and security requirements on the deploying units. Commanders must include contractor needs when considering the unit's life support, security, and mission requirements. This could have an impact on the availability of warfighters for the tactical mission.
Protection and Security
There may be a contract condition requiring the military to provide security to contractor personnel and their equipment. Commanders are responsible for all personnel and activities in their AO, including the contractor's work force deployed on the battlefield. The nature of the maneuver will determine the extent of security requirements for contractor personnel and their operation.
One issue under review is whether or not contractors should be responsible for their own security. Provisions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions and other applicable international laws do not consider contractor personnel as combatants. Therefore, it is not certain if contractor personnel legally can carry weapons. Regardless of this unresolved issue, contractor personnel may choose to carry weapons. Subject to the commander's decision, and with appropriate training, standard military weapons and ammunition can be issued to contractor personnel during deployment processing. Contractor personnel will be held accountable for Army-issued weapons and ammunition.
Civilian contractors may carry Government-issued sidearms for self-protection. To ensure availability of such weapons, commanders must add them to their inventories. However, civilian contractors may refuse to carry weapons. In that case, military forces must provide security for these personnel. Commanders also must decide whether or not to issue weapons to non-U.S. contractor personnel. Considering these requirements, commanders will have to conduct ongoing risk assessments to make sound decisions.
Another danger to consider when employing civilian contractors is infiltration of the contractor work force. Even an enemy with relatively unsophisticated conventional battlefield capabilities can have very sophisticated operatives who can sabotage information processing systems. But attacks on civilian logistics operations can be more direct than infiltration. For example, civilian organizations rely on civilian communications systems, which are more vulnerable to terrorist strikes.
In summary, the added security requirements for contractor personnel and equipment must be coupled with the very real danger of infiltration, sabotage, and communications disruption in the AO. As a result, commanders must stay aware of contractor operations in their area and must be able to implement a contingency plan with little or no notice.
Risk is the chance our commanders and their units take when deploying for a military or humanitarian mission. Risk assessment is a tool the commander can use to determine the potential level of hostilities in the AO. Adding civilian contractors to that equation adds risk factors that must be considered during the assessment and planning phases for all missions and contingencies. The Army's needs are changing on the verge of Army XXI and AAN. With the push for a smaller and more lethal force, increased operating tempo, and power projection, our future leaders must be prepared to address these changes. At the same time, they must be trained to integrate civilian contractor logistics support into their overall planning process. We are behind the power curve already.
At present, contractors are deployed in various theaters of operation. They will continue to be deployed in the future, very likely to a greater extent and possibly forward on the battlefield. The emphasis now must be on the training for our future leaders. "Civilian contracting as a force multiplier" should be added to the Army's professional development program. Training on the subject must be given priority at all levels of command. Aside from the formal, technical senior leadership training, priority of training should go to our junior leaders who will use such services. Junior leaders must become familiar with the advantages and limitations of deploying system and contingency contractors. Civilian outsourcing and contracting courses should be offered as early as the Officer Basic Course. As a minimum, leaders should receive comprehensive instruction in the types of contractors, the role of the contractor on the battlefield, location of the contractor on the battlefield, command and control, military support to the contractor, and protection and security. Leaders also must understand their limited command relationship to the contractor work force and their regulatory requirements to support the contractor in the AO.
The use of civilian contractors on the battlefield does not replace force structure. Therefore, commanders and planners must be familiar with the contractor selection process. They must be prepared to conduct parallel contingency planning in the event a contractor does not perform or refuses to perform in a hostile environment. Leaders must know how to anticipate and plan for the potential impact on their mission and their forces. Planners must remember that civilian contractors are force multipliers only and avoid total dependence on them. ALOG
Captain Isolde K. Garcia-Perez is the joint training officer with the U.S. Army Element, Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency Support Unit at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. She has an M.A. degree from Troy State University. Captain Garcia-Perez is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Supply and Service Management Officer Course, and the Multifunctional Combat Service Support Course. She wrote this article in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation from the Army Logistics Management College's Logistics Executive Development Course.