Sustaining Northern Iraq

When the 173d Airborne Brigade dropped 1,000 paratroopers into northern Iraq, the provisional 201st Forward Support Battalion went into the theater with them.

by Captain Jamie L. Krump

The mountainous terrain near the Turkish and Iranian borders in northern Iraq is vastly different from the broad plains of southern Iraq.

On 26 March, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne assault to secure the Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq and then prevent the Iraqis from moving north and the Turks and Kurds from moving too far south.  The brigade was augmented by the 201st Forward Support Battalion (FSB) (Provisional) from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), which provided a logistics battalion headquarters; supported Task Force 1 –63, the heavy task force assigned to the 173d; and augmented critical shortages in the 173d's support structure.


Forming an FSB

The 201st FSB's mission began when 21 junior enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers from the 1st Infantry Division Support Command (DISCOM) departed Vilseck, Germany.  After a bus ride to Frankfurt Airport, they boarded a commercial flight to Vicenza, Italy, with a final destination of northern Iraq.  They had little knowledge of what lay ahead or where specifically they were going in northern Iraq.

The battalion commander and some of the other key players were pulled out of Kosovo for the mission, and the battalion executive officer had been in Turkey waiting to pass the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) through to northern Iraq.  Still other members of the team had been preparing to go to Turkey for the same mission. 

The 201st FSB was provisional in that it was not an actual FSB, but rather a conglomeration of soldiers from across the 1st Infantry DISCOM pulled together to serve as a battalion headquarters that would support the 173d Airborne Brigade.  In addition to the 1st Infantry DISCOM personnel, soldiers from the 250th Forward Surgical Team (FST), the 38th Personnel Services Detachment, the 54th Quartermaster Mortuary Affairs Collection Point Platoon, and the 200th Materiel Management Center were added to the 173d's organic 501st Forward Support Company (FSC) to complete the 201st FSB (Provisional).

The 501st FSC consisted of approximately 150 soldiers who traditionally supported a light infantry brigade of about 2,000 soldiers.  An area support group heavily supplements this support in garrison since the FSC does not have the capability to support the 173d on its own.


Preparations in Italy

As soon as the plane touched ground in Italy, members of the 201st FSB began to get to know each other so they could function as a staff and formulate plans, develop logistics estimates, and try to anticipate problems.  The battalion was notified that it would have to provide a support staff for the 173d Airborne Brigade during their insertion into and subsequent occupation of an undisclosed location in northern Iraq.  Many questions had to be answered:  Would the use of Turkish airspace be possible?  Would the weather be suitable for an airborne assault?  Would ground lines of communication (LOC) from the north be allowed?  If not, how would the FSB provide adequate support for a light infantry brigade, augmented with a heavy mechanized unit from U.S. Army Europe, using only air LOC?

This mission would be the first time that a light airborne brigade, augmented with heavy mechanized assets, would be inserted completely by air.  The chosen location was Bashur Airfield, which was under the operational control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF –N).  The heavy forces consisted of a heavy reaction company (HRC) and a medium reaction company (MRC) from the 1st Infantry Division.  The HRC and MRC were equal to a 200-man battalion with 5 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 5 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 10 M113 armored personnel carriers, 4 M1064 mortar carriers, 1 M88 recovery vehicle, a scout platoon, a military police platoon, and a combat service support force enhancement module.  The 201st FSB's job was to go in with the 173d Airborne Brigade and quickly set up the materiel management support the HRC and the MRC would need to back up light infantry operations in northern Iraq. 

While in Italy, the FSB had refined the support requirements for the brigade, both with and without the HRC and the MRC.  To mitigate a shortfall of scheduled sustainment flights, the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) established a warehouse in Miesau, Germany, in which to store, prepare, and rig supplies for the FSB in northern Iraq.  Sustainment flights to Iraq were increased to ensure that the brigade had enough supplies for all combat operations.


Operations at Bashur Airfield

The 173d conducted an airborne assault on 26 March to capture the Bashur Airfield.  This was 24 hours before most of the logistics troops landed.  Over the following 5 days, the remainder of the task force troops flowed in and began to develop a logistics hub.  The first aircraft carried the personnel and equipment needed to establish the base camp.  Once the initial setup was complete, the sustainment flights of supplies and equipment began, signaling the start of real-time logistics.  While simply inserting the equipment and personnel was a challenge, moving the HRC and the MRC quickly and setting up the support they needed to sustain the 173d Airborne Brigade often required logistics planning and executing "on the fly."  The diverse FSB staff was up to the task.

The first elements of the FSB arrived by air with only two satellite-based wireless Iridium phones and a couple of laptop computers.  They begged for and borrowed equipment whenever they could to establish a makeshift tactical operations center (TOC) until more equipment arrived.

Initially, the wireless phones were used extensively to make sure the sustainment flights had the right stuff on board.  The 21st TSC's 200th Materiel Management Center (MMC) from Kaiserslautern, Germany, provided outstanding support to the FSB and to the brigade during this time.  However, prioritizing supplies and sustainment shipments seemed to require a code that was difficult to crack.  By the time the FSB's requirements were pushed through the logistics channels to the point of embarkation in Germany, either its needs had changed or it was discovered that the requirements had been relayed inaccurately.  It became a vicious cycle that was difficult to overcome.

Even though the 200th MMC and the FSB coordinated the FSB's requirements, a number of mitigating factors often caused low-priority supplies to arrive on time while critical supplies were delayed.  First, the airfield at Ramstein, Germany, was packed full of pallets for missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations.  This made it difficult to marry up the right pallets with the right plane.  Second, the FSB initially did not have a liaison at Ramstein to make sure the right pallets were loaded on the right plane.  Third, the planes loaded with the FSB's supplies sometimes developed problems and had to return to Ramstein or go to Incirlik, Turkey.  At other times, bad weather caused planes to be diverted to Constanta, Romania.

Eventually, most of these problems were solved.  The battalion's communications equipment improved, as did its reporting system.  The improved system captured an accurate status of what was on hand and where other supplies and equipment were needed.

The HRC and the MRC needed at least 22,000 gallons of fuel on hand to conduct sustained combat operations.  Initially, the FSB established a 30,000-gallon fuel system supply point (FSSP) with one 20,000-gallon bag and one 10,000-gallon bag.  Eventually, the FSSP grew to contain 80,000 gallons.

The decision was made to purchase diesel fuel locally.  It would be easy to convert from JP8 to diesel since filter changes are not required.  (However, converting back to JP8 does require all new fuel filters.)  Obtaining fuel in northern Iraq at first would appear to be a simple task.  Not so.  Northern Iraq had been cut off from resupply for many years, and the only way to get fuel was by smuggling it from southern Iraq and Turkey.  It became apparent that purchasing fuel locally was not a workable solution when an initial contract for 40,000 gallons of fuel produced only several hundred gallons delivered in 55-gallon drums on the bed of a pickup truck.

Delivery of fuel by C –17s and C –130s proved to be impractical.  Because of the limited size of the airfield at Bashur and the threat to the aircraft, the planes would not spend more than 45 minutes on the ground, which was not long enough to offload large quantities of fuel.  All flights occurred at night, and unloading fuel from an airplane requires even more time during darkness.  

The only workable solution for obtaining fuel was to establish a ground LOC.  Because the FSB was cut off from all forces in the south, it was necessary to establish a northern ground LOC.  Finally, Army Forces (Turkey) negotiated an agreement with the Turks to let fuel tankers cross their border into northern Iraq. 

To make sure the fuel arrived at the right place and to ensure the safety of the drivers, the 173d sent escorts to meet the Turkish tankers at the Harbur border gate between Turkey and Iraq and accompany them to Bashur Airfield.  Extensive coordinating and forecasting were required to prevent the fuel tankers from sitting too long before being emptied.  These convoys ensured that sufficient fuel assets were available to call forward the HRC and the MRC to support the 173d as it conducted offensive operations to seize Kirkuk, Iraq, and its airfield.


Expanding Supply Management

Just as the 201st FSB was getting its systems in place to provide solid support to the 173d Airborne Brigade, the battalion was directed to take over the forecasting and managing of all supplies in northern Iraq.  The supply and services officer in the 201st support operations office was already providing a daily logistics status report to the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command, so she modified her report to include forecasts for the Air Force at Bashur Airfield, the JSOTF –N in Irbil, Iraq, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit in Mosul, Iraq.  She quickly established a reporting chain with these units that allowed her to forecast accurately the needs of all units in northern Iraq.  This was no easy task because there was a constant influx of units from all services into the region and it was impossible to forecast their arrival times correctly.

Supporting northern Iraq became an equation of supplies divided by trucks and soldiers on hand.  No matter how many trucks were contracted or how many workers were hired, there still was a shortage of equipment and manpower to receive, break down, and distribute the quantity of supplies required.  At the culmination of its mission, the 201st FSB supported over 7,000 personnel at four locations spread over an area spanning hundreds of miles.  This included heavy mechanized units, aviation assets, special operations groups, Air Force units, Marine Corps units, and any other units that passed through the northern half of the theater.

To lessen the strain on available manpower, the FSB created the mother of all distribution plans.  The plan broke down the loads on every truck by pallets to be delivered to each location (Mosul, Irbil, and so on).  The 200th MMC personnel in Turkey forwarded to the FSB the bumper number of each truck, the name of its driver, and, based on data from the FSB's distribution plan, information on the units that were to receive the items on the truck.  The FSB sent up unit requirements by location, and the 200th MMC folks in Turkey made sure that the pallets were configured correctly.  The FSB escorts met the Kirkuk-bound convoy at the Iraq border and called out identifying truck and unit information.  The identified trucks dropped out of the convoy and were escorted to the unit designated to receive the supplies they carried.  This distribution system stopped the drain on resources in the FSB's supply support activity (SSA) and allowed the FSB to operate more efficiently.


Materiel Management Team Operations

From the beginning, the materiel management team (MMT) was an extremely important part of the FSB.  The team helped the battalion to gain visibility over what was inbound and to give high priority to critically needed items.  The MMT received a 48-hour crash course in a number of electronic communication, tracking, and supply support systems just before its departure for Italy. 

Using a system called "support requisitions," MMT personnel submitted offline requisitions to the 200th MMC rear, which filled the requisitions and pushed the supplies forward on sustainment flights.  This was an essential part of establishing the base camp, because initially there was no connectivity to the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS); therefore, there was no way to place requisitions for deadlined vehicle repair parts, needed equipment, and supplies.  Until SARSS was established, only the MMT had input into what was flown into Bashur Airfield in support of the 173d's mission. 

Army and Air Force personnel assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade clear land at Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq.

Standard Army Management Information Systems

After the essential equipment and supplies were on the ground and SARSS was established, the DISCOM's combat service support automation management officer (CSSAMO) looked for ways to make the supply system work more efficiently.  He found that several of the Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) were not prepped properly before deploying.  For example, a listing of forward unit identification codes had not been loaded into the Standard Army Maintenance System-1 (SAMS –1).  Tweaking the STAMIS was a huge challenge, but eventually all systems were up and running.

Several other problems resulted from simple oversights.  For example, some units did not come to the area of operations prepared to plug into different voltage power sources.  Therefore, they lost equipment after plugging it into the wrong voltage.  Supporting units were quick to push replacement equipment forward in order to get the STAMIS operational again for all units on the battlefield.


Maintenance Management in Northern Iraq

Maintenance management in Iraq followed models developed during rotations to the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.  Maintenance meetings with all units were conducted every day at 1000 throughout the operation.  The battle rhythm was always the same.  The night before each meeting, the daily not-mission-capable disk from SAMS –1 was run.  The maintenance NCO in charge scrubbed the resulting 026 (deadline report) to make sure the right vehicles were listed.  Then two MMT soldiers recorded the status of all requisitions.  In the morning, the support operations officer compared the scrubbed 026 to his copy with notes from the day before.  After this thorough review, very few parts needed followup at the 1000 maintenance meeting. 


The Battle for Kirkuk

Soon after everything had fallen into place at Bashur Airfield and the battalion's logistics systems were running smoothly, the 173d Airborne Brigade received a midnight mission to attack and secure the city of Kirkuk by dawn.  The 1st Infantry Division HRC and MRC had just arrived at Bashur Airfield when it was determined that Kirkuk was becoming destabilized.  The 173d was ordered to seize Kirkuk, stabilize it, and secure the airfield that was in the center of the city.

Inevitably, logistics support would be needed in the forward area.  The HRC and the MRC went forward with only 5 days of supply, which meant that a forward logistics element would have to be set up quickly.  An advance party consisting of the 201st FSB commander, two drivers, and four staff members went forward the morning after the 173d and the MRC moved into Kirkuk.  The battalion executive officer remained in charge in Bashur.

As the battalion moved south, the challenges that would be involved in providing logistics support to a brigade (+) that was spread out over 125 miles became apparent.  In fact, logistics became the ultimate challenge because most of the logistics personnel remained in Bashur while the majority of the supported units were forward.  Not only did all sustainment received through the air hub in Bashur have to be transported forward, but supplies from the ground LOC had to be pushed to multiple locations. 

Contracting was critical.  The brigade's contracting officer contracted for 50 trucks to transport incoming supplies and to support all movement forward to Kirkuk.  The contract included various types of Iraqi trucks.  Most were 20 footers, but there were some 40 footers and lowboys.  The truck contract bridged the logistics gap for the brigade for 30 days.

At Kirkuk, the brigade and the FSB began setting up operations on the airfield.  The SSA and the maintenance platoon for the 501st FSC moved into a military hangar.  This proved to be a great location for the SSA, because the hangar had lots of room and overhead cover and, most importantly, it was right next to the airfield. 

A bulk fuels retail point was established in some carports across the street from the SSA, an ammunition section in the Iraqi ammunition supply point, and a 100,000-gallon FSSP (two 50,000-gallon bags) near the flight line to make it easy to refuel helicopters.  The battalion headquarters was set up in a two-story building, and the brigade's administrative logistics operations center was placed next to the brigade's tactical operations center.  When half of the 501st's hangar was given to the Air Force, the maintenance platoon moved a mile down the road into an Iraqi motor park. 

In Bashur, the battalion executive officer and the remaining staff assumed command and control of the brigade elements and worked to clear Bashur Airfield.  This was not easy because flights were still arriving and almost all of the subsistence and ammunition, along with 80,000 gallons of fuel, was still in Bashur.

In the week that followed, the 501st Transportation Platoon, augmented with the 50 contract trucks, continued to push supplies, personnel, and equipment to Kirkuk.  Trucks were driven to Kirkuk one day and back to Bashur the next.  However, Bashur still was not being cleared fast enough.  Although the distance between the two points was only 125 miles, the condition of the roads and the Iraqi trucks caused the trip to take up to 6 hours.  To speed up the process, the convoys began to make complete round trips every day.  After about a week, the executive officer and most of the remaining staff departed Bashur to link up with the forward logistics element.

Essential supplies, including fuel, were left in Bashur to complete the closeout of the airfield; the rest were sent on to Kirkuk.  The support operations maintenance officer and a six-man team were left to close out operations in Bashur.  The last big push was moving ammunition from the ammunition holding area.  Thirty pallets of ammunition were transported in one convoy.  Air Force security personnel who needed to get to Kirkuk served as guards for the Iraqi trucks hauling ammunition.  After this push, only the assistant S –2/S –3 and three others were left in Bashur to clear the FSSP.

It is usually easy to get rid of fuel, but in this instance it was difficult.  About 30,000 gallons were left, and no one wanted it.  JSOTF –N volunteered to send their contracted Turkish tankers up from Irbil to drain the fuel from the bags.  Once this was complete, the team closed the FSSP and prepared it for shipment to Mosul, which was no easy feat without engineering support.  The FSSP assets and fuel eventually were delivered to the 101st Corps Support Group in Mosul, which needed all the fuel and storage assets it could get. 


Moving Toward a Steady State

When the entire 173d Airborne Brigade closed on Kirkuk, operations seemed to become more systematic.  Providing support became much easier because the entire FSB was collocated.  The battalion established an airfield at Kirkuk, and the Air Force provided critical support in developing the base.  The job was big, and available supplies and assets were limited, so the Army and the Air Force often worked together; alone, neither service had enough equipment to build a base camp.

The 173d Airborne Brigade escorted Air Force fuel from Mosul to Kirkuk until the task was taken over by the 101st Corps Support Group.  Once all of the Air Force personnel arrived, they slowly picked up all missions and began to support the 173d.  The Air Force gradually became the base camp manager, and the Army became the tenant.

Thanks to the Air Force and the 173d's contracting officer, Kirkuk Airfield became a comfortable place to live and work.  Windows were replaced, air conditioners were installed, and plumbing was fixed to provide showers.  Just after Memorial Day, the 201st received word that it would be replaced by a team from the 21st TSC.

The lessons learned in providing sustainment in Iraq were many.  The most refreshing lesson was that everyone could work together in a time of need.  Units separated by tremendous distances pulled together to provide each other with supplies that normal supply channels could not provide. 

It quickly became obvious to the FSB that outside planners could not anticipate all issues before the operation.  The environment was far too fluid for those at higher echelons to come up with a reliable sustainment plan for providing constant support.  The air LOC was unreliable because planes broke down and weather conditions were unpredictable.  The ground LOC from the north worked well when the trucks made it across the border and the drivers did not go on strike before reaching their destinations. 

The challenges presented were difficult, changes were slow, and the supply flow was sluggish.  But everyone involved gave all they had to keep other units functioning.  In spite of the sustainment problems it experienced, the 201st FSB is proud to have served with the 173d Airborne Brigade and proud of its logistics triumphs while sustaining northern Iraq.  ALOG

Captain Jamie L. Krump is the S –4 for the 701st Main Support Battalion in Kitzingen, Germany.  She served as the Support Operations Supply and Services Officer, Transportation Officer, and Mortuary Affairs Officer for the 201st Forward Support Battalion during its deployment to Iraq.  She has a bachelor's degree in English and sociology from Viterbo University in Wisconsin and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course. 

The author thanks Major Jeffrey Vieira, Captain Travis Cartwright, Captain David Williams, and Staff Sergeant Adin Agenbroad of the 1st Infantry Division Support Command and Chief Warrant Officer (W –2) John Ryan of the Alabama Army National Guard for their contributions to this article.