The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 presented a new set of less distinct yet more complex challenges to the regional unified commanders. One of those challenges is the increased likelihood that the United States will be drawn into sudden regional wars. According to the National Defense Council Federation, the top 10 potential conflict areas likely to involve the United States are Afghanistan, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
Years of budget constraints, force downsizing, and the steady withdrawal of U.S. forces from overseas bases have eroded the options available to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and unified commanders to meet challenges to U.S. security effectively. After glancing at a map, the question that leaps out is, "How can power be projected into these potential conflict areas in a timely manner?" High-speed sealift, a technology available commercially today, could help solve this strategic mobility dilemma.
A major problem facing the United States is its inability to project land power into or within a theater of operations at the speed and tempo required. This strategic transport problem limits a combatant commander's ability to deter conflict, respond with enough land power to prevent escalation of a crisis, or defeat opponents quickly and decisively if required. It limits the Army's ability to get into a fight and sustain it. The relevance of the Army hinges on strategic airlift and sealift. High-speed sealift puts a powerful tool back into the combatant commander's toolbox, vastly enhancing his ability to resolve a crisis. In short, high-speed sealift will fill the gap in strategic deployment capability that currently limits the joint force from reaching its full potential to deter and defeat future opponents.
The 2000 Army Science Board study, "Technical and Tactical Opportunities for Revolutionary Advances in Rapidly Deployable Joint Ground Forces in the 2015-2025 Era," found that a highly lethal and survivable force incapable of rapid deployment is not relevant in a power-projection Army. Conversely, a highly deployable light force with limited lethality and survivability is not likely to deter a determined foe.
Rapid projection of joint forces and their continued sustainment are the critical capabilities underpinning the ability of U.S. forces to respond effectively around the globe. During the most recent conflicts involving U.S. forces, moving forces and supplies into and around the theater quickly was a major problem.
Throughout the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, U.S. forces encountered problems with deploying ships to the Balkans quickly. During Operation Desert Shield, 82d Airborne Division troops from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were deployed rapidly but with so little firepower that they were referred to jokingly as a "speed bump." And in Somalia, ships loaded with equipment were unable to offload because no ports in the area could accommodate them. Thus, operations were delayed.
Since the end of the Cold War, the centerpiece of the U.S. defense strategy has been power projection. Power projection is the ability to deploy U.S. forces rapidly and effectively and sustain them from multiple, dispersed locations. By complementing overseas presence, power projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Global power projection provides national leaders with options they must have to mitigate potential crises.
In October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced his vision of a future in which the Army would field lighter, more lethal, less logistically demanding, and more deployable forces than the current Army of Excellence. The bad news is that, no matter how much the U.S. military is transformed to become lighter, more lethal, and more agile, its forces still cannot be deployed to most of the projected hot spots in the world in a timely manner.
The current Defense transportation system cannot support the Army's strategic mobility requirement to be able to move a medium brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days, which limits the options available to the unified commanders. Each leg of the strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning) depends on the other, but each has inherent weaknesses.
Strategic airlift is a combination of military and commercial aircraft. The military airlift fleet consists of approximately 700 troop and cargo carriers, including 90 C-17 Globemaster IIIs and 88 C-141 Starlifters (which are being replaced by Globemasters with an ultimate goal of 222) and 418 C-130 Hercules transporters. The airlift fleet also includes 104 C-5 Galaxies, which, because of maintenance problems, have only a 60-percent readiness rate.
In addition to a chronic shortage of transport aircraft, many other factors, such as maintenance posture, airfield throughput capability, and level of airfield modernization, further exacerbate the strategic airlift problem facing the U.S. military. The chances of having world-class airfields are remote in many parts of the world. While it is true that C-17s can land on airfields that are well below optimal standards, the unloading capabilities of those airfields must be examined closely. For example, the Army's Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), which is designed to be lighter and more agile than current heavy forces, could be used by a combatant commander in a number of ways. It could be deployed as a deterrent or for defensive or offensive operations. According to the Army Training and Doctrine Command table of organization and equipment for an SBCT, the deployment footprint for this unit is approximately 13,948 short tons. If the travel time to the aerial port of debarkation was 12 hours, and aircraft from U.S. airlines were contractually committed to move all of the soldiers, it would take 2 days and 58 C-17s and 62 C-5s (based on their 60-percent readiness rate) to move all of the SBCT's equipment. The space needed to contain the SBCT's equipment at the aerial port of debarkation would be immense. More importantly, intense competition for available airlift during a crisis would limit the Army's ability to build land power within the theater and limit a combatant commander's ability to deter, contain, or quickly and decisively resolve a regional conflict.
The second leg of the strategic mobility triad is sealift. Strategic sealift includes many types of ships, but the three major types of vessels are containerships; large, medium-speed, roll-on-roll-off (LMSR) vessels; and tankers. Sealift capability comes from three sources: Government-owned ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to the Department of Defense, and ships operating in commercial trade.
According to Research Memorandum 91-109 from the Center for Naval Analysis, a lesson learned from the Gulf War and Kosovo is that some ships cannot meet required timelines. During the Gulf War, eight fast sealift ships were tasked to respond on C-day and C+1. One ship was 1 day late, another was 3 days late, and a third was in overhaul and responded 9 days late. En route, the fast sealift ship that was pulled out of overhaul early suffered a series of boiler problems and was diverted to Rota, Spain, for repairs. The first wave of the fast sealift ships averaged only 23 knots, well below their advertised maximum speed of 33 knots, thus adding 5 days to the transit time. This problem only worsened as the activation proceeded. Of the 71 Ready Reserve Force ships used, only 18 deployed on time.
The final leg of the strategic mobility triad is prepositioning. Pre-positioning refers to the afloat pre-positioning forces (APF) and land-based pre-positioned equipment. All ships in the APF have an organic cargo-handling capability that enables them to discharge their cargo at austere port facilities.
The APF has three distinct divisions: the Logistics Pre-positioning Force, the Maritime Pre-positioning Force, and the Combat Pre-positioning Force. According to retired Army Colonel Kenneth Allard in his 1995 book, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, some APF ships are unable to discharge their cargoes at austere ports because of their draft (the depth of a vessel's keel below the water line). During the initial stages of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, three pre-positioned ships were not able to unload their cargoes because their draft prevented them from entering the harbor at Mogadishu. Even though all three had the capacity to offload "in the stream," rough seas made such an offload impossible. After 2 weeks of trying to find suitable ports, two of the ships returned to Diego Garcia without discharging their cargoes.
The advantage provided by the size of these ships is also a disadvantage because the choice of ports is limited. The amount of equipment these ships carry also must be taken into account. The space necessary for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) equipment is immense.
The land-based pre-positioned force is made up primarily of Army equipment, but the Marine Corps and the Air Force also have equipment pre-positioned on land. Land-based pre-positioning stocks are maintained in Europe, Southwest Asia, Korea, and the Pacific region. It is difficult and time-consuming to move them to other geographic locations. For example, during the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, the United States deployed two logistics support vessels (LSVs) to transport heavy equipment between the Balkans and Italy. It took 23 days to move the LSVs from the continental United States to the equipment site in Italy.
Although each leg of the mobility triad has strengths that complement the others, weaknesses remain. While airlift can get there the fastest, it has finite resources; sealift's success is related directly to speed and port access; and pre-positioned equipment is dependent on sealift to get it to the fight.
High-speed sealift is a force multiplier that provides combatant commanders with multiple options early in a conflict. The high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran, a type of SWATH [small waterplane area twin hull] vessel, already has proven itself in commercial and military applications.
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| The Joint Venture HSV-X1 is leased to U.S. forces and plays a logistics role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. |
The Joint Venture HSV-X1 high-speed vessel (HSV) is a wave-piercing catamaran fitted with a landing pad for SH-60 Seahawk or CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. It has a launch-and-recovery system for rigid inflatable boats up to 39 feet long and vehicle ramps that can accommodate heavy tracked vehicles. It is 315 feet long and has a two-part, hydraulically operated vehicle ramp that allows rapid loading, unloading, and discharge of vehicles from the stern or alongside. The vessel is highly maneuverable and can make a 90-degree turn at full speed and stop in three ship lengths. Powered by four Caterpillar 3618 marine diesel engines, it can transport 325 troops and 545 tons of equipment. A sample load configuration might include 209 soldiers with gear, 17 light armored vehicles (LAVs), 2 family of medium tactical vehicles trucks, and 2 high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Another might include 108 soldiers, 14 M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and 4 HMMWVs. The ship can carry these loads while traveling at 35 knots. The Joint Venture HSV-X1 is leased to the U.S. military and is used by U.S. Central Command to assist in the U.S.-led war on terrorism in its 25-nation area of responsibility that includes Afghanistan.
A smaller version of the HSV, the 282-foot Incat 045, renamed the HMAS [Her Majesty's Australian Ship] Jervis Bay, was chartered by the Royal Australian Navy for 2 years for logistics operations between Australia and East Timor. It completed 107 trips during that time, logging more than 100,000 nautical miles. Most of the Jervis Bay transits were across the 430-nautical-mile passage between Darwin, Australia, and Dili, East Timor, and typically were completed in less than 11 hours. The vehicle averaged 2 or 3 round trips per week at 43 knots while carrying 550 tons of troops, vehicles, and supplies each trip. It would have taken 14 to 17 military aircraft, spread over a 4- to 7-day period, to transport the same cargo.
According to military sources cited in Marc Strass' 20 November 2000 article in Defense Daily, the "Army Wants 14 High-Speed Catamarans to Speed Intra-Theater Lift." The proposed theater support vessel (TSV) would be approximately 394 feet long and equipped with engines that could transport 1,250 short tons in 25,000 to 30,000 square feet of deck space. It would have a sustained speed of at least 40 knots and be able to survive sea states of more than 5 feet. The TSV would have a range of 7,000 nautical miles unloaded and 1,000 nautical miles loaded. Two TSVs would be able to carry an SBCT battalion of troops with accompanying LAVs; seven TSVs could transport an entire SBCT. The TSV is expected to cost between $65 and $85 million each compared to the 1995 price tag of $309 million for an LMSR.
Use of the TSV would permit simultaneous deployment or employment of ground forces. It would take the burden off strategic airlift as the only means to move troops and equipment quickly. Fully loaded, the TSV's draft would be only 12 feet, which would allow a combatant commander to use significantly more ports within his area of responsibility. A TSV fleet, coupled with joint logistics-over-the-shore capabilities, would give a combatant commander an unprecedented ability to project land power ashore, bypassing ports altogether if necessary. Then the combatant commander could conduct operational maneuver and converging operations, compel an enemy to fight in multiple directions, and much more. Success in such operations still would depend, of course, on secure air and sea lines of communication, both inside and outside the joint operational area, and protection from air, surface, and subsurface threats.
At the operational level of warfare, the value of the TSV technology would magnify itself. If the military had enough TSVs to position them at ports near the future medium brigade combat teams and within the unified commands, RSO&I time could be cut significantly. Within 4 to 6 days of a deployment order, a combatant commander could provide a substantial amount of land power not only to special forces, rangers, and light infantry, but also to a hard-hitting mobile force of medium brigade combat teams that could arrive ready to fight. These high-speed vessels also would help reduce the need to transport soldiers and their equipment separately and cut the time required to offload or draw equipment from pre-positioned stocks. Brigades would arrive intact, having conducted planning and map rehearsals en route, with their equipment fully fueled, uploaded with ammunition, and ready to roll.
This deployment concept has limitations, however. Certain preconditions would have to exist to ensure the safe transport of Army forces aboard TSVs. A temporary joint task force or an existing maritime component command would have to be formed to manage the deployments. The burden of security for the TSVs while en route clearly would fall on the Navy, augmented by the Air Force and Army Special Operations Forces. This would be even more challenging because TSVs would be able to cruise at twice the speed of existing Navy surface vessels. Secure sea lanes of communication from the seaport of embarkation to the seaport of debarkation would have to be guaranteed. Protection from air, surface, and subsurface threats would have to be provided, including mine clearing, particularly at strategic chokepoints, port approaches, and in the vicinity of coastal landing sites. Rendezvous and refueling of TSVs at sea also would be required. The ports or landing sites would have to be secured and cleared before disembarking the brigades, a process that is similar to the critical tasks associated with Marine Corps amphibious operations.
Sixty percent of the world's politically significant urban areas are located within 25 miles of a coastline; 75 percent are located within 150 miles. The cost of procuring enough C-17s to provide adequate airlift to these areas is prohibitive. (In fiscal year 1998, a C-17 cost $236.7 million.) The TSV will cost roughly one-third as much as a C-17 and have a cargo-carrying capacity 12 times greater. The bottom line is that the United States currently cannot move significant ground forces to a crisis area in a timely manner without resorting to technology such as high-speed sealift.
The United States continues to be the world's sole superpower and the world's paramount source of political, economic, information, and military leadership. As such, it must be able to project forces quickly into trouble spots around the world without the restrictions of limited air transport and slow sealift. Therefore, the U.S. military must leverage available technology and invest in high-speed sealift. High-speed sealift, combined with airlift, conventional sealift, and pre-positioning, has the potential to create a synergistic effect and can be the key to operational and strategic success.
Major Kenneth E. Hickins is assigned to the office of the J4 of the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. He has a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska at Kearney and is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, and the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff, where he received a master's degree in national security and strategic studies.