In the first of two articles on the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the author discusses the commander’s role in planning and executing the program successfully.

During my deployment to Iraq to provide support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanders sometimes expressed frustration that the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) did not meet their expectations. I believe the commanders’ perceptions stemmed, in part, from the fact that they did not fully understand their roles and responsibilities in planning and executing the program and did not always have realistic expectations of the program’s capabilities. LOGCAP’s strengths lie in preplanned support and economies of scale and effort. These strengths have not been exploited fully because of incremental, bottom-up planning rather than top-down, integrated staff planning; underdeveloped theater contracting management processes; and a lack of knowledge at all levels of what the program can do and how to access it.

Two major findings of a 2004 Government Accountability Office audit of LOGCAP operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were that the Department of Defense did not comply fully with guidance on identification of contracting requirements early in the planning process and that the LOGCAP contractor was not adequately involved in the planning process. I believe that Army Materiel Command (AMC) Pamphlet 700–30, LOGCAP, does not detail the tactical- and operational-level mechanics of LOGCAP or provide “how to” information the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and Army service component commanders (ASCCs) need to properly implement the contract during contingency operations. In this article, the first of two on proper planning and employment of LOGCAP, I will attempt to help fill some of the voids in that doctrine.

LOGCAP Doctrine

Army Regulation (AR) 700–137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), establishes Department of the Army (DA) policies, responsibilities, and procedures for implementing LOGCAP to augment Army forces during wartime. AMC Pamphlet 700–30 outlines procedures for commanders at both the DA and regional COCOM levels to follow when requesting and implementing LOGCAP services.

However, the pamphlet does not discuss operational and tactical execution or program mechanics. Nor does it explain fully how to maximize the program’s capabilities or establish who is responsible for identifying or validating LOGCAP requirements, writing statements of work (SOWs), preparing independent cost estimates, tracking funds obligated against the SOWs, or reviewing the technical execution program at the operational and tactical levels. Likewise, the responsibilities of the requiring and using activities are not addressed in the pamphlet.

. . . it is imperative that logisticians fully integrate, in logistics plans and orders, the functions performed by contractors together with those performed by military personnel and government civilians. — Joint Publication 4–0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations

LOGCAP Objectives

According to AR 700–137, the four main objectives of LOGCAP are to—

• Resolve the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) unit shortfalls represented in operation plans (OPLANs) and in the Army program.
• Consider conversion of existing support units based on availability of contract support in wartime.
• Provide rapid contracting capability for contingencies not covered by global OPLANs.
• Provide for contract augmentation in the continental United States during mobilization.

LOGCAP provides for preplanned use of global corporate resources to support worldwide contingency operations. The program is designed to provide support primarily in areas of operations where no bilateral or multilateral agreements or treaties exist, but it may be used to provide additional support in areas where formal host nation support agreements are in place. This support is provided by augmenting CS and CSS forces with contractors. Civilian contractors provide the Army with additional means to support current and programmed military forces by performing selected services such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping.

Civilian contractor support in a theater of operations frees soldiers and other military personnel to perform combat arms and CS missions. During the military drawdown of the 1990s, some Army CS and CSS functions were reduced and personnel transferred from Components (Compos) 1, 2, and 3 (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve, respectively) to Compo 9 (LOGCAP).

Although LOGCAP is an Army program, it can, with proper preplanning, coordination, and training, support other services in joint operations, Federal agencies through memorandums of agreement, and coalition partners through acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

The need for LOGCAP has increased as a result of reductions in the military force structure and reallocation of CS and CSS manpower to sustain the Army’s combat arms capabilities. Mandated force structure caps also have increased the need for contractors. The escalated U.S. involvement in military operations other than war, such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and East Timor, have strained the military operating tempo (OPTEMPO). LOGCAP provided support in those operations to reduce the “green-suit footprint,” decrease individual soldier OPTEMPO, and improve the deployed soldiers’ quality of life.

A KBR employee demonstrates proper sawing techniques to two Iraqi laborers as they construct a new military camp near Baghdad.

LOGCAP Contract

The LOGCAP base contract operates under an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity umbrella contract (one that covers many functional areas in one or more locations). The base contract provides for the winning contractor to develop a worldwide management plan; participate in exercises as directed; when requested by DA or funded by a COCOM, prepare LOGCAP annexes to joint OPLANs; and execute plans or provide logistics support to operations when directed by the contracting officer.

The LOGCAP contract was awarded competitively; it has a 1-year base period and nine 1-year renewal options. The current contract was awarded to Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) in December 2001. The contract does not stipulate a monetary ceiling; however, the number of events or contingencies KBR can support is limited.

The chart above shows some of the services LOGCAP can provide. This is not a complete list; in fact, there are few restrictions on the services that can be provided as part of the LOGCAP contract.

Legal Limitations

One of the most frequent misperceptions about LOGCAP is the fact that it is a service contract, not a supply contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to buy items or products. For example, the LOGCAP contractor can operate a motor pool and provide maintenance services for nontactical vehicles, but the Government cannot use the LOGCAP contract as a means to purchase the vehicles. The LOGCAP contractor can provide billeting services with environmentally controlled housing, but the contractor should not be used simply to purchase the housing. However, the contractor may purchase the items necessary to perform the services required under the contract.

All LOGCAP SOWs must be legally reviewed by the requesting command and the Army Field Support Command (AFSC) to determine if the requested work is permissible under current U.S. law, if the work is within the scope of the underlying LOGCAP contract, and if the requirements are properly funded.

LOGCAP is not a personal services contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to hire personnel who take day-to-day direction from military personnel or DOD civilians.

Planners must factor legal reviews into their planning timelines and work with their Judge Advocates General and LOGCAP advisors to ensure compliance with Department of Defense and Army Federal Acquisition Regulations.

Support Network

The Department of the Army (DA) Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, is the Army’s proponent for the LOGCAP program, and he approves its use in all operations. AMC is the Army’s executive agent for LOGCAP and has task-organized LOGCAP operations under AFSC. AFSC has three organic elements dedicated to LOGCAP operations—

• The Directorate of LOGCAP Operations (DLO) (formerly PM LOGCAP) manages LOGCAP. The DLO prioritizes planning requirements based on funding, workload, and DA guidance and advises the COCOMs on LOGCAP capabilities. DLO operations personnel are stationed forward with AMC logistics support elements (LSEs) in Southwest Asia, Europe, and the Far East.
• The LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) provides the soldier, or “green-suit,” interface between the COCOM or ASCC and the contractor; it deploys worldwide in support of LOGCAP operations. The LSU is responsible for advising the COCOM, ASCC, or joint task force commander on how to access, use, and integrate LOGCAP properly in contingency operations. In small, single-site operations, such as the 1999 humanitarian mission in East Timor, an LSU soldier also may serve as the contracting officer’s representative. The LSU has three detachments of logistics and engineer officers with teams aligned to support each of the COCOMs. Four Active Guard/Reserve officers are included in the structure.
• The Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) manages the LOGCAP contract and subordinate task orders and statements of work during peacetime and contingency operations.

During contingency operations, these three elements deploy into the theater of operations and serve under the operational control of the theater AMC LSE Forward. Additional Department of Defense and DA assets from the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers may be task-organized with the LSU, DLO, and PCO to form “Team LOGCAP.”

KBR Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom In November 2002, KBR deployed to Kuwait to prepare Camp Arifjan in Kuwait for the anticipated influx of U.S. troops. Since that time, KBR has— •Prepared more than 160 million meals. •Washed more than 6.2 million bundles of laundry. •Produced more than 1 billion gallons of potable water. •Transported more than 300 million gallons of fuel. •Hosted more than 18 million patrons at morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. •Delivered more than 560,000 bags of mail. •Logged more than 50 million miles transporting supplies and equipment for the military (with more than 900 trucks on the road each day). KBR now has 48,000 employees and subcontractors deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to support the U.S. military. Although KBR and its subcontractors have lost a number of their personnel to hostile actions, they continue to honor their commitment to ensure that the troops serving in Iraq have the best food, shelter, and quality of life possible.

DCMA administers the contract in theater as delegated by the PCO and provides quality oversight through its quality assurance representatives. The agency develops, trains, and manages the contracting officer’s technical representatives in the supported units. DCMA also evaluates contractor performance and issues letters of technical direction when needed. When required, the Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering and construction contracting officer’s technical representatives to evaluate LOGCAP operations.

Although Team LOGCAP facilitates implementation of the LOGCAP contract, the supported unit is the most critical “member” of the team when executing the contract. Supported units include the COCOM, the ASCC, the joint force land component command, joint task force, and their subordinate units. LOGCAP is not a “fire-and-forget contract” (a reference to a type of missile that does not require further guidance after launch). To maximize LOGCAP capabilities, the contractor must be fully integrated into staff planning and execution processes, then monitored closely by DCMA and the supported unit. Without the full engagement of the supported unit, contractor capabilities and performance will be reduced.

LOGCAP Enablers

The keys to maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities are integrated military and contractor preoperation planning and standard support criteria for using the program in a theater. An LSU support officer must be included in the staff planning process before and throughout the operation to advise the commander on LOGCAP’s capabilities.

DLO and LSU personnel are trained to advise commanders on the entire menu of LOGCAP services, inform them of program capabilities and limitations, and advise them on how to establish processes that will ensure effective operation of the program. These LOGCAP liaisons are not trained strategic planners; they are logistics and engineer officers or DA civilians. In past operations, DLO and LSU personnel have often been called “planners,” which misled the supported units to assume they were qualified planners (perhaps with functional area 59, Strategic Plans and Policy, or skill identifier 6Z, Strategist, designations) and expect them to conduct LOGCAP planning for their units. On the contrary, the supported command is responsible for planning and integrating LOGCAP into its OPLAN.

LOGCAP personnel can be accessed through the DA G–4 or through AMC LSE elements in Southwest Asia, Europe, the Far East, and the Army Forces Command in the United States. These elements have organic DA civilian LOGCAP operations personnel. The AFSC’s DLO also has DA civilian and contracted operations personnel.

The LSU has the most experience in executing LOGCAP operations on the ground in combat operations. During peacetime, ASCCs and personnel in theater support and corps support commands can learn much by tapping into the LSU’s collective experience, knowledge, and capabilities during theater and joint exercises. Participation in an exercise requires coordination through overseas coordination conferences and the ASCC G–3 in order to document future overseas deployment training requirements.

On average, KBR produces 74 million gallons of water per month for LOGCAP.

LOGCAP Mobilization

Because LOGCAP is not automatically approved for use in COCOM OPLANs or contingency plans (CONPLANs) and must be approved by the DA G–4, the LSU is not included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) on any existing OPLANs. In Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this disconnect resulted in an “ad hoc” mobilization and deployment process, which impeded LOGCAP capabilities. To prevent a recurrence in future operations, the DA G–3 should be notified in a general-officer-level requirement letter from either the DA G–4 or AMC to mobilize LSU personnel as soon as theater planning begins and a requirement for LOGCAP has been identified, validated, and approved. LSU personnel then can be called forward into theater by the AMC LSE Forward commander as needed.

It is absolutely critical that the LOGCAP contractor be involved in the planning process as soon as possible to ensure that he has enough time to formulate the plan, hire and train the required personnel, and procure the proper type and quantity of equipment and move it into the theater to support the mission. Without a comprehensive, upfront SOW, additional costs are sure to result from unknown requirements. A good initial SOW that is designed to augment organic military capabilities will help ensure proactive planning and performance.

To enhance the integrated planning process, COCOMs and ASCCs must ask that a LOGCAP contractor planning cell be incorporated into their theater planning cell. Since the LOGCAP contract is preawarded, contractor input during the planning process does not present a conflict of interest. An underused provision of the LOGCAP base contract calls for the contractor to provide a planning cell to analyze existing theater OPLANs and CONPLANs and write the LOGCAP annexes during periodic reviews of those plans. It is critical that the COCOM specify that personnel in the LOGCAP contractor planning cell must have CS or CSS theater-level planners’ backgrounds and top-secret security clearances. Quality, upfront integrated planning, sufficient time, and adequate funding of the SOW will help ensure success in providing support during the operation. The northern theater-opening option through Turkey that was developed by U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a good model for a theater-funded contractor planning cell. It is unfortunate that diplomatic barriers forced the 4th Infantry Division to deploy through Kuwait and those plans were not carried out.

In the July–August issue of Army Logistician, I will discuss planning considerations and identify critical tasks and management processes that will assist the U.S. military in maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities in future operations. ALOG

Colonel Karen E. LeDoux is a student at the Army War College. She was the Commander of the LOGCAP Support Unit Forward in the Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Element (AMC LSE) Forward-Southwest Asia with the Coalition Forces Land Component Command and the AMC LSE Iraq supporting Combined Joint Task Force 7. She is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army Logistics Management College’s Associate Logistics executive Development Course, Joint Course on Logistics, and Multinational Logistics Course.

The author would like to thank Major Jeanine Cunliffe, S–2/3 of the LOGCAP Support Unit and LOGCAP Support Officer in the Multinational Division-Central South, and Major Karl “Rudy” Schelly, LOGCAP Operations Officer in Combined Joint Task Force 7, for their advice and assistance in the preparation of this article.