by Lieutenant Colonel Darrel A. Williamson, USAR
This article expresses views of the author, not the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
One of the success stories of Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the evolution of contracted logistics support through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). From its beginning in the early months of Joint Endeavor, through the transition to a new contract 18 months later, to the support it provides today, the contractor has been an indispensable part of the mission. Not only has the quality of support been exceptional, but using the contractor has augmented the military's ability to execute the mission, at reduced cost and without deploying thousands of logistics and engineer soldiers in the Balkans.
Obtaining support through LOGCAP is one of several tools available to the commander. LOGCAP, along with contingency contracting, assistance in kind, and host nation support, supplements the Army's wholesale supply system. It uses cost-plus contracts, which means the contractor is reimbursed for reasonable costs plus an award or performance fee. Commanders shouldn't use LOGCAP to buy supplies. LOGCAP's design allows contractors to provide services and perform construction jobs.
The responsiveness of the contractor and the contracting support provided by the Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center have been vital to the success of contracted logistics support in Bosnia. However, five actions taken in the theater have been critical to success: establishment of joint acquisition boards to control new work; creation of a transition mechanism for executing follow-on contracts; deployment of administrative contract officers; inclusion of the contractor on the command team; and institution of financial management tools to provide timely visibility of costs.
Joint Acquisition Boards
A consistent review process, with well-defined limits for the expenditure of funds, was established at the start of the operation. This review process was conducted by joint acquisition boards (JAB's), which were established at both the intermediate staging base in Hungary and Task Force Eagle in Bosnia.
Each JAB consisted of five voting officers and as many nonvoting members as were needed to review each new project. The JAB validated the requirement for each project, reviewed the estimated costs to determine if the budget could cover it, and assessed alternatives before approval. This process occurred weekly, or more frequently if special requirements arose that needed immediate action.
The approval authority was limited at various levels by the amount of dollars that could be spent on a project. The chief of the Base Camp Coordinating Agency (BCCA) was authorized to spend up to $1,000; the JAB could approve any project up to $25,000; and the commander of the National Support Element and Task Force Eagle had an approval authority up to $50,000. The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting is the theater contracting commander and policy advisor for the USAREUR JAB. Any spending requests over $50,000 involving the contractor, Brown and Root Services Corporation (BRSC), had to be approved by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), USAREUR. All of the organizations involved in the process needed to communicate constantly with each other to ensure that all requirements were understood.
Transition to Follow-on Contracts
The original LOGCAP contract, awarded to BRSC and managed by the Corps of Engineers, came up for renewal in 1997. Following a competition, DynCorp was awarded the contract under the management of the Army Materiel Command. However, to maintain continuity of support, it was decided to stay with the same management team for Joint Guard. So a sole-source contract was awarded to BRSC to continue its logistics support, with management provided by the Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center. The transition from the LOGCAP to the "Operation Joint Guard Sustainment" contract in May 1997 went smoothly and was invisible to troops in the field.
Theater oversight and management of the contract was provided by the USAREUR ODCSLOG. As the theater evolved to the sustainment phase under Operation Joint Guard, the mission changed from building base camps and getting soldiers out of the mud to improving living conditions and maintaining facilities and operations. The contractor focused on continuing the normal, day-to-day activities of feeding, sheltering, and clothing the troops and performing unprogrammed work. An example of unprogammed work was upgrading tents. When the tents started to deteriorate after over a year in use, an extensive effort was undertaken to repair or replace the canvas or build Southeast Asia-designed buildings ("sea huts") instead of acquiring new tents.
The composition of the contractor team remained relatively constant throughout the mission, but the military and Government civilian teams managing the contract rotated on 6-month tours of duty. Units also rotated in and out of the theater. This turbulence caused some confusion for both the contractor and the Government teams. The result was some loss of continuity, since each new team had to learn what agreements and procedures had been established. Fortunately, the award of the Operation Joint Guard Sustainment contract allowed for procedures and processes to be reestablished; lessons learned could be applied in restructuring some old processes.
Administrative Contract Officers
Problems developed when military leaders who were not familiar with the contracting process and the specifications of the sustainment contract attempted to direct the contractor to perform work. In some cases, leaders believed the contractor should respond to fragmentation orders as the military would. In Joint Guard, the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) was tasked to provide contract administration through two deployed teams, one in Hungary and one in Bosnia. An administrative contract officer (ACO) was deployed to each location to work with the contractor and issue notices-to-proceed or stop-work orders. In addition to the ACO, each DCMC team had personnel to administer the contractor's property and quality assurance personnel. These teams were instrumental in administering contractor activities and working with USAREUR.
To educate military leaders on working with contractors in the field of operations, DCMC personnel provided information to the leaders and staffs on the contractor's mission and purpose. Some senior leaders were not even aware of the ACO's and their role in contract administration. The commander of the DCMC teams realized that more open communication was needed, so he organized management councils with key leaders in both Bosnia and Hungary. Council meetings provided leaders with insights on the operations performed by the contractor and strengthened communications among the command staff and contract administrators.
Conferences With the Contractor
Headquarters USAREUR organized and executed planning conferences to keep the contractor informed about long-term and mid-term planning. The quarterly conferences pulled together the resources of the USAREUR staff and provided a comprehensive view of the operation. These conferences allowed the contractor to plan for surges in the rotations of units and to perform long-term planning for closing base camps and terminating operations. When events such as the local Bosnian elections caused an increase in the need for support, the planning conference was the tool for informing the contractor so it could plan the use of its resources.
Financial Management Tools
Tracking where money is being spent is the area of the operation that contract managers scrutinize most carefully. However, contract managers in Bosnia soon discovered that the cost reports generated by the contractor, as specified in the contract, did not meet their needs. So USAREUR developed a new report to track costs by base camp.
When reviewing the alternatives for new work projects, the costs of using reserve component soldiers, transporting troops, and other factors had not been considered. This created the false impression that military resources were cheaper than local labor. To determine the least costly alternative for a project, a full cost evaluation was essential.
The contractor on the ground used local labor. The contractor constantly was required to provide a rough cost estimate, called the rough order of magnitude (ROM), from which the JAB could determine the relative cost of a project. Unfortunately, most officers believed the ROM was a firm cost estimate; they also failed to realize that each ROM added to the cost of the contract.
The JAB's were needed to control requests for unnecessary projects and find lower cost alternatives. The JAB's were able to look at the labor mix and provide a review of who was available to perform the tasks. The contractor was one of many resources available; contingency contracting, host nation support, and military labor also could be used. For each project, the JAB could require a review of alternatives and approve the project (or recommend it for approval), or they could table the project for further review.
Teamwork is the key to success. The contractor must be considered part of the military team and included in all planning and training. Military leaders need to understand the rules and conditions of working with the contractor as part of the force. The contractor needs to be responsive to the customer and aware that it provides the support for the force.
Units that will use the LOGCAP contractor should fund and include contractor personnel in exercises. Liaison and management teams consisting of two or three officers should be established to provide a single point of contact for the contractor, DCMC, and supported units. Finally, the contract review process needs to be initiated, based on an understanding of the contracts used to support the operation. ALOG
Lieutenant Colonel Darrel A. Williamson, USAR, was assigned to ODCSLOG, HQ USAREUR, as chief of the logistics contract cell when he wrote this article. He holds a B.S. degree in space science and an M.S. degree in systems management from Florida Institute of Technology. He is a graduate of the Army Logistics Management College's Logistics Executive Development Course and Materiel Acquisition Management Course and the Army Command and General Staff College.