The Army defines military operations other than war (MOOTW) as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces" (FM 100-5, Operations). The Government continues to send soldiers to perform this "nontraditional" role. I want to address the logistics implications and the "command logistics perspective" in MOOTW situations.
I have written previously in Army Logistician on the equivalent nature of logistics ("Equivalent Theory of Logistics," January-February 1995) and have criticized the shortsighted view the Army traditionally takes when defining logistics in the study of warfare. The same reasoning applies, perhaps more so, in the conduct of MOOTW. The command logistics perspective must guide the MOOTW force commander in many circumstances.
I recently attended the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, where one of the joint staff student exercises was to plan a disaster relief effort in support of a developing nation. The scenario depicted half a million displaced civilians in need. Insurgents in the joint operations area posed a considerable threat to relief efforts in the region.
The exercise required the joint staff students to develop courses of action in accordance with joint operations planning and execution system (JOPES) requirements and to present a concept of operations decision briefing to the regional commander in chief (CINC). We followed the five-paragraph operations plan format to develop the CINC's concept of operations-
1. Situation.
2. Mission.
3. Execution.
4. Administration and logistics.
5. Command and signal.
What was remarkable about the exercise was the failure of the students and faculty to recognize what should have been the main effort. The students squarely faced the difficulty imposed by the security versus humanitarian relief dilemma. They stated in paragraph 2 (mission) that security and humanitarian relief were the operational objectives. Both the written product and subsequent decision briefing presented security as the main effort in paragraph 3 (execution). Paragraph 4 (administration and logistics) was presented as the support plan to distribute relief supplies and medical and civil engineering services.
I was the only logistician in the joint staff group. In the after-action review conducted by the students and faculty, I suggested that paragraph 3 should have been devoted to the logistics concept to provide humanitarian aid. I felt that logistics (including civil engineering) was the operational main effort, while security, communications, and intelligence were supporting efforts. I felt that paragraph 4, on the other hand, should have reflected the internal administration and logistics required to support the force, not the displaced civilians. Other members of the joint staff group felt that this was a debatable, bureaucratic point, not worthy of further discussion.
Wrong! I believe the point I made was an important leadership point, not bureaucratic trivia. Simply stated, the plan we developed had one great flaw: a glaring mismatch between the mission and the concept of operations. In effect, the mismatch was in conflict with both joint and Army doctrine, which recognize the need to support other than Department of Defense agencies and the role of administrative support in accomplishing our national objectives.
The "command logistics perspective" is often the cornerstone of the commander's intent and concept of operations. I am not suggesting that we turn over humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and support of domestic civil authorities to a logistics commander (although this may be appropriate in some cases). Rather, I believe the appointed commander must train his staff to be less "stovepiped" in the plans and orders process.
For example, in MOOTW, understanding the capabilities of reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU's) and mortuary affairs teams may be more important than directing the operations of a light infantry battalion. MOOTW must be organized and planned around mission main efforts, and the command and control headquarters must be staffed and funded accordingly.
During MOOTW predeployment activities and deployment operations, it may be necessary to go "logistics and movement control heavy" in the emergency operations center. The main tasks in the crisis action planning phase may be to determine logistics requirements and compare them to the logistics units' capabilities. For example, should we send a mobile Army surgical hospital or a combat support hospital to care for 100 anticipated surgical patients? How many tons of bulk food could be transported 144 kilometers by a light-medium truck company? Does that company have materials-handling equipment? Should we airdrop food instead of distributing it on the ground? Could the Navy use its logistics over-the-shore capability to assist a coastal population in need?
The incountry joint task force operations center also may be "logistics heavy," with a supporting communications hierarchy designed to command and control a number of logistics units and, if necessary, contractors. Intelligence efforts may be influenced by the host nation infrastructure (or lack of) and the willingness of host nation political leaders to provide basing, overflight, and other logistics support. A Navy warship may be required to purify water or provide medical support and electricity to a coastal community. A large-scale civil engineering project may be needed to provide land lines of communication to a supported foreign internal defense effort.
I believe our service and joint doctrinal planning procedures are sound and our staff expertise is sufficient. Changes need to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. In pursuit of process improvement, we need to consider how to best "exploit" the expertise and channel the main effort to help the commander make sound decisions.
While working in the G4 section of the XVIII Airborne Corps command post in Saudi Arabia from early August 1990 to March 1991, I could hardly grasp the enormity of the logistics endeavor we were undertaking. However, I intuitively knew that the parochial, "stovepiped" Army command and staff structure was not providing optimal support to the main Desert Shield task at hand. Contrary to commonly held perceptions, Desert Shield was a MOOTW. It was unlikely that Saddam Hussein would attack Saudi Arabia, so the focus of military activity before hostilities occurred should have been on force buildup. Unfortunately, most of the command and control structure was oriented toward something other than the main effort.
I had to come to grips with the role logistics commanders and staffs were called to play in supporting the misdirected intentions of the theater. The efforts of our command, control, and communications assets should have been focused on the desired logistics end state. Instead, because of their branches and positions, the logistics specialty staff officers had to operate in supporting rather than supported positions. Had we correctly directed the commanders and staffs at all levels toward the true main effort, we would have had more efficient and effective operations before and during the ground offensive.
What Army doctrine does fail to recognize is what Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles called "command logistics perspective" (Logistics in the National Defense). This perspective is especially pertinent to planning and conducting MOOTW. Unless we properly focus the use of our scarce military resources on the main effort, we jeopardize support of our more pressing wartime needs. We must recognize that command logistics may sometimes override the traditional combat orientation of commanders and staffs. It may be appropriate to include logistics in paragraph 3 (execution) of our MOOTW plans and orders as the main effort to be supported. ALOG
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, a Quartermaster Corps officer, is commander of the 47th Forward Support Battalion, Baumholder, Germany. He has served in a variety of logistics staff positions, including 193d Support Battalion operations officer in Operation Just Cause; XVIII Airborne Corps G4 plans officer during the Gulf War; and battalion executive officer, 82d Airborne Division. He is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; and the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.