The framework used for the corps rear area, with rear area operations centers (RAOCs) directly supporting corps support groups (CSGs) in the logistics support areas (LSAs).
In March 2001, the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, participated in a warfighter exercise known as Operation Dragon Comet. To prepare for the exercise, the corps conducted a workshop in September 2000 to familiarize personnel involved in corps rear operations with current doctrine. Experts were brought in from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to teach the fundamentals of rear area doctrine to the key leaders and staffs of the corps' units. Once these corps leaders were familiar with the doctrine, they would be able to help subordinate commanders plan and prepare for the exercise.
At the workshop, the commander of the Headquarters Command, which is referred to locally as the "Dragon Brigade," introduced the staff of the corps rear area (CRA) units to the personnel of the corps rear command post (CRCP) and explained the CRCP structure. The corps Deputy Commanding General (DCG) is the rear area commander, and his Chief of Staff is the commander of the Dragon Brigade. The 139th Rear Operations Center (ROC), a North Carolina Army National Guard unit from Raleigh, comprises the operations and intelligence cells, while the rear operations center commander is the G3 Rear. The rest of the CRCP is made up of personnel from the corps staff sections and liaison officers from various units in the CRA.
As the largest unit in the CRA, the 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) is a key player not only in sustaining the corps but also in aggressively conducting rear operations in the CRA. The four functions of rear operations are sustainment, movement control, security, and terrain management. The sustainment mission is assigned to the 1st COSCOM commander, who is the senior logistician in the corps. The 330th Corps Movement Control Battalion, a specialty battalion assigned to the 1st COSCOM, is responsible for movement control in the CRA and for all nontactical moves in the corps area of operations, culminating in the coordination and publication of a movement program every 12 hours. The clearly drawn lines of responsibility end there.
Doctrinally, a corps has several rear area operations centers (RAOCs), which are Reserve component units specifically designed to assist with managing and coordinating rear operations. Typically, each division has one RAOC to assist with its rear operations, while a corps has from two to five.
Because of his concern for security and counter-reconnaissance during the exercise, the DCG placed the RAOCs in a direct-support relationship with each corps support group (CSG). Since the corps commander had used a military police (MP) battalion as the tactical combat force, the security forces in the CRA were limited. Each RAOC functioned as a separate staff cell for each CSG commander and focused purely on rear operations, while the CSG organic staff performed its wartime combat service support mission.
Because of this task organization, it was possible to establish a habitual relationship between the Reserve component RAOCs and the Active component CSGs that would facilitate future training and planning. By placing the RAOCs in a direct-support relationship to CSGs, the DCG could hold brigade-level commanders responsible for seeking out and eliminating the enemy in their assigned areas. Since each RAOC commander is a lieutenant colonel and the CSG and corps separate brigade commanders are colonels, the direct-support relationship made sense. The relationship worked, thanks in large part to the flexibility and doctrinal expertise of the RAOCs.
Because of its size and area of responsibility, the COSCOM can provide the CRCP with current situational awareness for the CRA. To understand how the 1st COSCOM can improve battlefield situational awareness, it is important to look at the framework used.
Each CSG requested the space it needed to perform its mission. These areas were made into logistics support areas. Then the other units in the CRA requested space within those logistics support areas. Once all of the units were situated in the CRA, the CRCP determined the CSG areas of responsibility. Each unit was located within a CSG area of responsibility, which was commanded and controlled by the CSG commander, with the assistance of the assigned RAOC. Large areas with no units were identified as CRAs. The 16th Military Police Brigade was responsible for the security and terrain management of those areas.
The COSCOM G2, with the assistance of the Corps G2 and 16th Military Police Brigade S2, then conducted a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield for the CRA. Once named areas of interest (NAIs) were identified and approved, each CSG and RAOC developed a rear operations plan.
The first order of business was to develop base defense plans. The CSG commanders arranged the units in their areas of responsibility into bases and base clusters. Bases generally had from two to six company-sized units, while a base cluster contained two to five bases. The CSG commanders also selected major subordinate commanders (at the brigade level) to be base cluster commanders, responsible for base-defense reaction forces within their clusters. Once the groups consolidated their plans, they forwarded an overlay and cartoon sketch to the 1st COSCOM G3 Rear Operations Section to be included in the overall COSCOM base defense overlay.
The CSGs also produced detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plans, which ensured that they had positive control over the NAIs in their areas of responsibility. In addition, a counter-reconnaissance plan was used to seek out and destroy the enemy before he could interfere with the sustainment of the corps. Both of these plans were given to the COSCOM G3 Rear Operations Section. Through discussions with the CRCP staff, the COSCOM G3 Rear Operations Section was able to integrate other available CRA assets, such as OH_58D Kiowa helicopters and AC_130 gunships, into the overall 1st COSCOM rear operations plan.
Traditionally, the mission to seek out and destroy the enemy in the CRA has been part of the security mission given to the corps MP brigade. However, the MPs were not staffed to defend all of the ground in the CRA while performing convoy security, site security, traffic control, and other security missions. Therefore, it was essential for every unit to take proactive force protection measures to seek and find the enemy, as well as provide their own security. The counter-reconnaissance patrols ensured that the enemy did not gain access to the life support areas of friendly units. In fact, the counter-reconnaissance plan worked so well that our base defense plans rarely were tested. When they were, the reaction forces in the CSG area of responsibility were able to respond more quickly (because of proximity, plans, and rehearsals) than the MPs could.
By identifying and using the CSGs' combat power, the 1st COSCOM provided convoy security for convoys that were not critical enough for MP support (or when MP support was not available). It was heartening to discover that our units are able to protect themselves without degrading mission accomplishment.
Due to life support and technological equipment requirements, the CRCP and the 1st COSCOM Tactical Operations Center (TOC) were located adjacent to each other for Operation Dragon Comet. This physical proximity proved to be the most important factor in the success of corps rear operations.
The corps DCG and the CRCP Chief of Staff attended the 1st COSCOM Commander's rear operations update briefing twice a day in the COSCOM TOC. The briefing was conducted around a map board and included updates from the COSCOM G2, the COSCOM G3 Rear Operations Officer, and the COSCOM Chemical Officer. A representative of the COSCOM Engineer section and the Movement Control Battalion also briefed when necessary. These briefings provided clear guidance straight from the DCG and presented a detailed picture, through the use of map overlays, that was not possible with technological tools.
Several times a day, the DCG also received updates from his own staff in the CRCP that focused more on specific unit missions. Instead of fostering competition between the CRCP and COSCOM staffs, these updates actually increased communication and coordination efforts. The result was two staffs whose work complemented each other for a common, precise mission.
The COSCOM TOC was collocated with the CRCP, the 44th Medical Brigade, and the 18th Soldier Support Group. This enabled the COSCOM commander to integrate all of the combat service support for the corps. The proximity not only aided in sustainment but also facilitated coordination among all of the rear operations functions. This coordination significantly contributed to the success of the XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Dragon Comet.
The XVIII Airborne Corps, and particularly the CRA, performed flawlessly during Operation Dragon Comet. Their performance is even more noteworthy because this was the first time the XVIII Airborne Corps had undergone a warfighter evaluation. Undoubtedly, the success of the operation was due to detailed planning conducted well in advance. In fact, the most important lesson learned from the exercise was that sufficient time must be allotted for planning. The entire operations and intelligence cell of the CRCP is manned by Reserve component personnel who do not have the opportunity to participate fully in the lengthy, detailed planning. Therefore, the corps staff had to allocate resources directly to the CRCP during the planning process. Rear operations usually are relegated to second priority behind the operational mission of the unit. However, it is not possible to carry out the operational mission of the corps unless rear operations are conducted successfully.
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The framework used for the corps rear area, with rear area operations centers (RAOCs) directly supporting corps support groups (CSGs) in the logistics support areas (LSAs). |
Rear operations doctrine is purposely vague. Far too many factors influence rear operations to be able to define them specifically. Commanders must be trusted to use their judgment and decide the best way to execute missions. They can shape rear operations based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians to guarantee their operational success.
During Operation Dragon Comet, the 1st COSCOM Commander, with a great deal of coordination with the corps and higher headquarters staffs, successfully planned and executed the sustainment mission. The 330th Corps Movement Control Battalion executed movement control in the CRA and all nontactical moves in the corps area of operations using detailed meetings with the CRCP staff, Corps G4 transportation experts, and MP representatives. Every unit in the CRA executed security and terrain management functions. The CRCP served as the mediator when conflicts arose, but the CSGs, with the aid of their RAOCs, were able to execute skillful terrain management, security, and counter-reconnaissance. The framework developed and used proved to be a highly effective model. ALOG
Captain Margaret H. Pratt is the Commander of the 42d Military Police Detachment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She previously served as Rear Operations Officer, G3, for the 1st Corps Support Command at Fort Bragg. She is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.