From Santiago to Manila:  Spanish-American War Logistics

One hundred years ago, the United States defeated Spain and assumed the status of a great power. The Army was unprepared, but the performance of its logisticians was Herculean.

"A splendid little war!" That was how John Hay, the ambassador to Great Britain, described the Spanish-American War of 1898. Although his comment might sound a little jingoistic a century later, he was simply reflecting the sentiments of most of his fellow Americans, who felt that the war with Spain was fully justified and who basked in the glow of a victory easily, quickly, and decisively attained.

Historians tend to look back on the Spanish-American War as something of a coming-out party for the United States. After spending most of the 19th century dealing with internal challenges—civil war, westward expansion, urbanization, industrialization—the United States was ready to make its grand entrance upon the international stage as a major power. The war with Spain was a demonstration of emerging American industrial and military strength. It also created something new in the American experience, an overseas colonial empire, as the United States acquired Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. (Hawaii was annexed in an action unrelated to the war but very much in its expansionist spirit.)

"Remember the Maine!"

The war had its roots in the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain. The Cuban Revolution that began in February 1895 was viewed with great sympathy by most Americans. That sympathy turned to outrage when the Spanish Governor-General of Cuba, General Valeriano de Weyler y Nicolau, attempted to crush the rebellion by herding thousands of Cubans into concentration camps; the terrible conditions in those camps led to an estimated 400,000 deaths. American popular resentment was whipped up by the press, particularly the New York Journal of William Randolph Hearst and the New York World of Joseph Pulitzer, which used ever more sensational coverage of the Cuban situation to gain readers in their escalating circulation war.

To show American concern as the situation in Cuba deteriorated, and to protect American citizens and property there, President William McKinley sent the battleship Maine to Havana, the Cuban capital, early in 1898.  But this "friendly" visit ironically turned into the catalyst for war: on the evening of 15 February, as it rested at anchor in Havana harbor, the Maine blew up with the loss of 260 American lives. A naval court of inquiry concluded that the explosion was caused by a submerged mine, though it could not determine who placed the device. [The cause of the Maine explosion has continued to be a matter of controversy. It might have been caused by an accidental coal bunker fire aboard the ship.] But by the time of the court's report, the American public had already reached its conclusion: Spain was guilty. Outrage over the Maine, coupled with outrage over Spanish conduct in Cuba and sympathy for Cuban independence, made the pressure for war irresistible.

On 20 April, President McKinley signed a congressional resolution that demanded that Spain "relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba" and directed the President to use the Army and Navy "to carry these resolutions into effect." On 22 April, the Navy's North Atlantic Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, began a naval blockade of Cuba. War was a reality.

Conditions on the Eve of War

The United States that entered the war had matured into an industrial colossus during the second half of the 19th century. For example, by 1890 the United States had passed Great Britain, the world's leading industrial power for over a century, in production of pig iron and steel. Then, during the short period from 1890 to 1898, U.S. steel production doubled. During the 1890's, the United States also overtook Britain—again the world leader—in coal production. American industrial prowess meant that production shortfalls would not be a factor in the war with Spain. Indeed, the Spanish-American War foreshadowed 20th century wars by demonstrating the increasing importance of industry to successful military mobilization.

Unfortunately, while American industry surged, the Army was stagnant. Its basic organization had remained fundamentally unchanged since the reforms instituted after the War of 1812. Authority in the Department of  War was divided among the Secretary of War (in 1898, Russell A. Alger), the commanding general of the Army (Nelson A. Miles), and the heads of the staff bureaus (such as the Ordnance and Quartermaster Departments). The commanding general was responsible for training, discipline, and military control of armies in the field, but he had no authority over the bureaus. The Secretary of War had to act as a chief of staff over the bureaus, which tended to operate as independent fiefdoms.

The Army was ill-prepared for the rapid expansion of both men and materiel needed to wage war. The Regular Army on the eve of the war had only 28,183 soldiers (2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men) on duty. It was a force largely designed for, and accustomed to, fighting Indians in the West. The Army had little in the way of reserve supplies to meet the greater requirements of a foreign war, and it was not permitted to contract for more materiel until war was declared.

The expansion of this small Army was complicated by the very cautious approach to war preparations McKinley and Alger followed until there was an actual declaration of war. As war fever grew, Congress did appropriate $50 million on 9 March for "national defense," but McKinley would use it only for improving coastal defenses and fortifications, not to prepare for offensive operations. (This policy did allow the Ordnance, Engineer, and Signal Departments to expand their activities.) After the war started, Congress appropriated $244.4 million for the Army by the end of 1898, in addition to the regular fiscal year 1898 appropriation of $62.5 million.

A Two-Theater War

Even before war was declared, it was obvious that Cuba would be the main strategic objective. However, Commodore George Dewey's unexpected demolition of a Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on 1 May determined that the Philippine Islands would become a second theater of operations for the Army. After the quick American triumph in Cuba, a third campaign would be mounted to seize Puerto Rico.

Miles recommended that the Army expand to 162,600 soldiers (regulars and volunteers). But once war was declared, there was an enthusiastic rush of men to enlist. The President called for 125,000 volunteers on 23 April and another 75,000 on 25 May, and both quotas were quickly filled. By the end of May, 163,626 enlisted men had been mustered into service. By the end of the war in August, the Army had 274,717 soldiers on duty, including 58,688 in the Regular Army and 216,029 volunteers. The Army actually overmobilized: less than one-fifth of those soldiers saw action.

The surge of men into service outstripped the Army's ability to equip them. Except for rifles, supplies on hand were inadequate to support the expanded Regular Army, let alone the huge number of volunteers. Determining logistics requirements was complicated by the lack of well-developed operational plans. Without a general staff, the Army had not developed plans for invading Cuba. After war was declared, plans seemed to change almost daily. The expeditionary force for Cuba originally was to be 5,000 men, then 12,000, and finally 25,000. Miles wanted to delay an invasion of Cuba until fall, when the yellow fever season would be over and the recruits would be better trained; the Navy wanted an immediate invasion, to beat the hurricane season, and their view prevailed with the President. The force originally was bound for Havana; then its destination was changed to Santiago, on Cuba's southeast coast, after the Spanish naval squadron of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete was found there. (The Navy's uncertainty about the whereabouts of Cervera's squadron, which had left the Cape Verde Islands on 29 April bound for the Caribbean, greatly complicated operational planning for both the Army and the Navy.)

Bottleneck at Tampa

Tampa, on the Gulf coast of Florida, was chosen as the point of concentration for the Cuba expeditionary force. It proved to be a poor choice, particularly as the force grew and its destination changed from Havana to Santiago. Tampa lacked adequate facilities and equipment for unloading and storing the incoming materiel, but its biggest drawback was its lack of rail capacity. The city was served by only two railroad lines, both single track: the Florida Central and Peninsular and the Plant. Only the Plant line ran on to the port, 9 miles from the city. The flood of men and materiel into Tampa quickly overwhelmed the available facilities and created monumental congestion. Within weeks, railcars were backed up on sidings as far north as Columbia, South Carolina.

As Secretary Alger observed, "Unquestionably, Tampa was not adapted to the concentration and the effective handling of the vast quantities of supplies necessary for an army of 25,000 men." When Miles arrived in Tampa on 1 June, he reached the same conclusion—

I found that place crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and war material. The confusion . . . appeared . . . to be utterly inextricable. The [rail] sidings from the port of Tampa for perhaps fifty miles into the interior were blocked with cars, and the resulting difficulties of the situation prevented proper embarkation of the troops.

The problems at Tampa were vivid evidence of the biggest logistics challenge of the war: transportation and distribution, not production. Between 18 May and 31 August, the depot at Tampa handled 13,239 carloads of supplies and equipment, as well as railcars transporting 66,000 soldiers (with baggage) and over 15,000 animals.

The Cuba Campaign

The order to load the troops assembled at Tampa on the transports came on 5 June. Within 40 hours, some 17,000 soldiers had moved to the port. The congestion and confusion of the camps were extended to the port, mainly because there was only one long pier for loading the men. Boarding soldiers anxious not to be left behind jostled for space on the transports. Theodore Roosevelt, the future President and an officer of the soon-to-be-famous Rough Riders volunteer regiment, described the loading as a "higglety-pigglety business."

After one abortive departure, the expedition finally left for Santiago on 14 June. On board were 819 officers, 15,058 enlisted soldiers, 30 civilian clerks, 272 teamsters and packers, 107 stevedores, 2,295 horses and mules, 114 six-mule wagons, 81 escort wagons, 7 ambulances, 16 light field guns, four 7-inch howitzers, four 5-inch siege guns, 1 Hotchkiss revolving canon, 1 pneumatic dynamite gun, eight 3.6-inch field mortars, and 4 Gatling machineguns.

After the transports arrived off Santiago on 22 June, the commander, Major General William R. Shafter, decided to land at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of the city. When the initial landings were made, Shafter sent troops to occupy nearby Siboney. Siboney then became the main theater logistics base.

The Spanish had about 13,000 men to defend Santiago. After chasing the enemy out of Las Guasimas, 3 miles toward Santiago, Shafter paused to bring up supplies and newly arrived troops from Siboney. He then ordered a two-pronged attack on the Spanish defensive positions at El Caney and the San Juan Heights for 1 July. Both objectives were gained after fierce fighting; the taking of the San Juan Heights was highlighted by the famous charge up San Juan Hill led by the Rough Riders, under Theodore Roosevelt, and the African-American 10th Cavalry Regiment. Following these battles, the Spanish retreated into the defenses of Santiago. The siege of Santiago involved more negotiation over surrender terms than bombardment, particularly after Cervera's fleet attempted to fight its way out of Santiago harbor and was destroyed by Sampson's squadron on 3 July. The Spanish defenders finally surrendered the city on 17 July.

The Philippines and Puerto Rico Campaigns

The U.S. triumph in Cuba decided the outcome of the war. The Spanish felt that they had defended their honor and saw no reason for continuing the fight after the fall of Santiago. Diplomatic contacts (made through the French Ambassador to the United States) led to the signing of a peace protocol in Washington on 12 August and the beginning of formal negotiations on a peace treaty. (The Treaty of Paris was signed on 10 December.) The peace protocol cut short the Philippines and Puerto Rico campaigns.

Three troop contingents were sent from San Francisco to the Philippines to capture Manila: 2,500 men on 25 May; 3,500 on 15 June; and 4,800 on 27 to 29 June. Managing the men and materiel converging on San Francisco was a smoother process than at Tampa. The numbers involved were smaller, but San Francisco also was a better embarkation site: it had better rail connections and harbor facilities. The San Francisco depot was able to expand quickly to accommodate over 30,000 soldiers. The only serious problem was obtaining enough transports to carry the Army to the Philippines, and the Quartermaster Department solved that by procuring (mostly by charter, in a few cases by purchase) all available vessels on the Pacific coast.

The first contingent arrived in Manila Bay on 30 June and went ashore at Cavite, south of Manila, the next day. The second and third contingents landed at Tambo, closer to Manila, and set up the expedition's main base, Camp Dewey, 3 miles from the city's southern suburbs. By the time the third contingent arrived at the end of July, the U.S. force consisted of 470 officers and 10,464 enlisted men under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt.

The 13,000 Spanish defenders of Manila faced more than Merritt's troops: they also were besieged by over 20,000 Filipinos under Emilio Aguinaldo who were fighting for independence. After a brief battle on 13 August, the Spanish surrendered the city the following day; on 16 August, news arrived that the war was over.

The Puerto Rico campaign was launched after the surrender of Santiago in hopes of forcing Spain to sue for peace and thereby eliminate the need for a campaign against Havana. The expedition was commanded by Miles, who left Guantanamo, Cuba, on 21 July with 3,415 soldiers on 9 transports. They landed at Guanica, on Puerto Rico's southwest coast, on 25 July. Miles had formed an elaborate plan: capture Ponce, Puerto Rico's second largest city, on the south coast; then send three columns of troops north from Ponce to drive the Spanish back into the defenses of San Juan, Puerto Rico's capital; and conclude by laying siege to San Juan. Ponce was occupied on 27 July, but before much more of the plan could be executed, the war came to an end.

Subsistence

Subsistence supply in the Spanish-American War was largely a success in terms of quantity, though there were field distribution problems in Cuba. More serious were the quality problems, which were caused by lack of planning for feeding soldiers in the tropics.

The Commissary General of Subsistence, Brigadier General Charles P. Eagan, established a subsistence depot at or near each major camp where regulars and enlistees congregated before moving to Tampa or San Francisco. The existing purchasing and depot commissaries at New York, Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, New Orleans, and San Francisco bought and shipped to the camp depots enough rations to meet current demands and maintain a 60 days' supply.

The Subsistence Department was so successful in procuring rations that it created a problem of over-supply, which resulted in a great deal of spoilage. Regulars moving to the camps at first carried 30 days of rations, but that practice was ended in late May because too much food was accumulating. Six to seven million rations were shipped to Tampa, which added to the storage problems there. But the troops in the camps never lacked for food.

While the accumulation of rations was impressive, the Army had given little thought to changing its standard rations to meet tropical conditions. The field ration included bacon; hard bread; coffee and sugar; beans, rice, or hominy; and, if possible, potatoes, onions, and canned tomatoes. The travel ration provided hard bread, canned fresh or corned beef, canned baked beans, and coffee and sugar.

The canned beef was meant to be cooked in a stew; otherwise, it was stringy and tasteless. The Subsistence Department did not intend for canned beef to be the main staple of the troops in the field or to be consumed cold. Unfortunately, soldiers traveling to Cuba subsisted largely on cold, uncooked canned beef from their travel rations because the transports had no cooking facilities. Canned beef then was added to the field ration in Cuba and dominated the diet of the troops there, leading to much grumbling.

A commissary depot was established at the main supply base at Siboney. To expedite issue of food, regimental commissaries were allowed to draw rations without submitting requisitions. Lack of transportation hindered distribution of rations to the front, where accumulations were limited to 1 day of supply. Some soldiers contributed to food shortages in the field by throwing away the 3 days of rations they carried in order to lighten their packs in the heat.

Soldiers going to the Philippines and Puerto Rico were more fortunate. Those expeditions had transports equipped with refrigeration equipment, so the troops had fresh meat. Once the troops arrived in the Philippines, a contract was awarded to obtain refrigerated meat and fresh vegetables from Australia.

Clothing and Tents

The rapid expansion of clothing procurement demonstrated the power of American industry. The War Department had purchased no shirts or pants during the period from 1 July 1897 to 30 April 1898. It then procured 500,000 shirts and 500,000 pairs of pants between 1 May and 15 August. At one point, 100,000 uniforms were manufactured in only 2 weeks. Shoes were a similar story. After buying only 27,950 pairs in the preceding year, the War Department acquired 782,303 in the same 3½ months. When the war ended, the Army was left with a considerable surplus of clothing.

Most of the clothing was purchased, but a fair quantity was manufactured at the depots at Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Jeffersonville, Indiana. The Philadelphia depot, by far the largest, still used the system that had been in effect for a hundred years: the depot cut garments and provided them to contract seamstresses, who returned the finished products to the depot. The number of seamstresses employed by the depot increased from 1,100 to well over 4,000 during the war.

Two problems did hinder the clothing effort. When the war began, the regulars took the field in the traditional blue wool uniforms, which were heavy and uncomfortably hot for the tropics. Unfortunately, the short length of the war did not permit the Army to make major changes in clothing design. There were some minor adjustments, such as issue of lighter underwear, and some canvas uniforms were issued, but they proved to be as hot as the wool suits. The troops bound for the Philippines, with fewer numbers and more time to prepare, fared better than those going to Cuba: they received lightweight clothing, including a white drill suit, in addition to their wool uniforms.

There also were problems in distributing clothing. Transportation bottlenecks, most notably at Tampa, delayed delivery of uniforms to volunteers assembling at the camps. Provision of canvas suits to soldiers in Cuba was hindered by lack of transportation inland to the front; as a result, the suits sat onboard transports and were not delivered until after the surrender of Santiago.

Demand for tents exceeded projections, mainly because the large number of sick soldiers meant more tents were needed for field hospitals. The Philadelphia depot fabricated 199,000 tents, while the War Department bought another 172,000.

Wagons and Animals

With motorized transportation still very much a novelty, the Army relied on wagons and animals (both draft and pack) to move materiel. However, no wagons had been acquired in the 9 months before the war. As of 1 April, the Regular Army had an inventory of 500 four-mule wagons, 592 six-mule wagons, 96 Red Cross ambulances, 6,071 horses (6,120 of which belonged to cavalry units), and 2,021 mules.

The Quartermaster Department estimated that it needed 5,000 wagons for the war. The Army actually bought 4,620 wagons, though not all were delivered before the hostilities stopped and relatively few reached the theaters of operations. Wagon manufacturing companies did not have time to make wagons to meet the Army's specifications, so most of the wagons procured were four-mule farm wagons. The Army also purchased 16,618 horses and 20,182 mules during the war and distributed over 90 percent of them to units. The procurement of animals outpaced that of wagons.

The shortage of wagons during the war's initial stages hampered distribution of supplies at the camps. By mid-May, there were 1,000 railcars loaded with supplies on sidings in and around Tampa, but the Army had only 17 wagons to unload them. Fifty railcars were arriving every day, but only two or three could be unloaded because of the wagon shortage.

Lack of wagons also caused distribution problems in the theaters. The poor roads and trails in Cuba—often hilly, muddy, and overgrown with vegetation—made using wagons problematical and hindered movement of supplies to the front. The roads and trails also reduced the capacity of the mules: animals that normally could carry 250 pounds could manage only 100 pounds in Cuba. Sickness among teamsters and packers exacerbated distribution problems. Soldiers often could substitute for teamsters; skilled packers, however, were harder to replace, with the result that pack trains were sometimes delayed.

The expeditions to the Philippines were fairly well equipped with wagons and animals. However, the demand in the theater still exceeded the supply. The theater quartermaster rented two-wheeled carts pulled by ponies and carabao (water buffalo) on the local market and supplemented them by hiring Chinese and Filipino coolies to move supplies.

Ocean Transportation

The Spanish-American War was the first U.S. war to be fought overseas. Ocean transportation therefore was critical to reaching the fight. Unfortunately, no one in the Army was experienced in large overseas movements. The Army's only previous large-scale ocean movement had been 51 years earlier, during the Mexican War. (See the article "Pack Mules and Surf Boats: Logistics in the Mexican War," in the November-December 1997 issue of Army Logistician.)

Even before war was declared, the Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Marshall I. Ludington, began investigating the availability of commercial vessels that could be chartered as transports. Congress was opposed to granting U.S. registry to foreign vessels, so for the Cuba expedition the Army was limited to chartering U.S. vessels involved in the Atlantic and Gulf coastal trade. By 1 July, the Quartermaster Department had chartered 43 transports, 4 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 2 ocean tugs, and 3 decked barges for Cuba; another 14 transports were chartered on the Pacific coast for the Philippines expeditions. More were chartered in July and August. When enough vessels could not be chartered, the Army purchased 14 steamships and quickly outfitted them to carry troops to Cuba and Puerto Rico.

By the time the Cuban expedition sailed from Tampa on 14 June, it was loaded aboard 38 vessels and accompanied by Navy ships. However, poor estimates of carrying capacity meant that the transports could move only about 17,000 soldiers, not the 25,000 originally planned. The transports also were fitted out to house soldiers for the short run from Tampa to Havana, the original destination, not for the longer voyage to Santiago. As a result, conditions on board were cramped, uncomfortable, and unsanitary, and the lack of cooking facilities led to the unfortunate overreliance on canned beef.

Unloading the troops at Daiquiri was a fairly smooth operation. The Navy landed some men, but most came ashore on small boats (the transports' lifeboats) that they manned themselves. By contrast, landing supplies was a slow and laborious operation, mainly because there was only one small dock at Daiquiri and because only one of the expedition's lighters had reached Cuba. To relieve unloading problems in Cuba, the Army contracted with a New York firm to send workers to Cuba to build lighters, barges, and docks, as well as repair railroads and engines. These workers arrived on 23 July, after the surrender of Santiago, but they were sent on to Puerto Rico to support the expedition there.

The transports bound for the Philippines were better fitted for a long voyage than those going to Cuba. The accommodations generally were more comfortable, and, most importantly, there were galleys for cooking. However, there were unloading problems in the Philippines and problems moving supplies between the two bases, Camp Dewey and Cavite. Many men and supplies went ashore on cascos—the native lighter of the Philippines—towed by captured Spanish tugs or Navy launches; each casco could carry 200 men with tents, packs, and 10 days of rations.

Ordnance

The biggest ordnance challenge facing the Army was equipping the volunteers. But that raised an important question: should they receive the Danish-designed Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle, which the Army had adopted in 1894 and with which the Regular Army was equipped; or should they receive the .45-caliber, single-shot, black powder Springfield rifle adopted in 1873 and used by the National Guard? Because there was a large supply of Springfields on hand and expanding production of Krags would take time, it was decided to issue Springfields to the volunteers. Production of Krags was increased, but of the 26,728 turned out between 1 April and 1 September, fewer than 1,000 were issued. Ammunition supply was a success. Ammunition was a priority for the pack trains in Cuba, so the troops at the front generally had a plentiful supply.

Aftermath

Although Americans rejoiced in their impressive triumph, the Army's performance didn't escape criticism. Much of the controversy resulted from the large number of deaths caused by disease. While only 369 soldiers died of battle-related causes, 2,565 had died of disease by the end of September. Typhoid fever was a problem in the U.S. camps, which were not always sanitary. And despite Shafter's best efforts to hurry his campaign and extract his force from Cuba before the fever season, cases of yellow fever began to show up in his camps during the siege of Santiago. After the surrender, the War Department began shipping soldiers to Montauk Point, New York, to recuperate. Within 3 weeks, some 22,000 soldiers had been moved to Montauk, and half of them were suffering from diseases contracted in Cuba.

The high level of sickness among soldiers in Cuba was aggravated by shortages of medical supplies. Many medical supplies were packed at the bottom of the transports and were unloaded last. Transportation and distribution problems in the theater further delayed movement of medical supplies to the front.

To investigate these and other problems, McKinley appointed a special commission headed by railroad owner Grenville Dodge. The Dodge Commission concluded that there had been no corruption or intentional neglect of duty in the administration of the Nation's war effort, but that the management of the Army needed improvement. While praising the "herculean effort" of the Quartermaster Department in accomplishing so much so quickly, it criticized the lack of organization in supplying the camps, the failure to prevent congestion at Tampa, and the lack of planning for a fleet of transports. These shortcomings were attributed to a lack of trained officers and a general lack of preparedness. Ironically, the Army had emphasized manpower mobilization, which produced more troops than were needed, at the expense of materiel mobilization. The result was a catch-up logistics effort that succeeded in spite of much confusion, waste, and inefficiency in distribution.

Significant reform did come to the Army in the next few years, primarily through the efforts of Secretary of War Elihu Root, who served from 1899 to 1904. A general staff was created; the commanding general of the Army was replaced with a chief of staff; the system of permanent tenure in the staff departments (a prime source of entrenched bureaucracy in logistics) was replaced with a system of 4-year details; and the Army War College was established. The result of these reforms was an increase in the professional capabilities of the Army.

While reforms clearly were needed, the logistics performance in the Spanish-American War had been credible in view of the lack of preparedness and the lack of planning for an overseas, tropical war. As Army historian James Huston concluded, "Given the existing situation, it may be . . . said that the War Department in many ways did a remarkable job of meeting the enormous task suddenly thrust upon it." It is interesting to note that in the year after the war, the Army efficiently outfitted a force four times larger than Shafter's and moved it to the Philippines without significant problems.

And while the integration of the armed forces was 50 years in the future, the Spanish-American War did offer a glimpse of the Army to come, as then-Lieutenant John J. Pershing observed—

White regiments, black regiments, regulars and Rough Riders, representing the young manhood of the North and the South, fought shoulder to shoulder, unmindful of race or color, unmindful of whether commanded by an ex-Confederate or not, and mindful only of their common duty as Americans.

—Story by Robert D. Paulus