by First Lieutenant Anthony J. Alfidi
While preparing a pickup point for the tracked vehicles of Task Force 1-7 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, during a 1997 rotation of training exercise Intrinsic Action in Kuwait, the 563d Movement Regulation Team (MRT) encountered a serious problem. When a mix of U.S. Army and Kuwaiti contract heavy equipment transporters (HET's) attempted to maneuver over soft sand deeper than 2 inches, the HET's sank down to their axles and had to be towed out. This eliminated the possibility of setting up a doctrinally correct pickup point for the tracked vehicles that eventually would be uploaded on the trucks. The trucks would have to be loaded after they were on the nearest hard-surfaced road. Loading on the road, however, complicated the MRT's job of matching tracked vehicles to lift assets, since not all the Kuwaiti HET's were M1 Abrams tank capable; in other words, they did not have a lift capacity of at least 60 tons.
The solution proposed by the task force assistant S3 and several troop commanders was to bring the HET's and the tracked vehicles together before they reached the hard-surfaced road. The column of HET's would pass the task force's marshaling area to a point where the MRT noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) would stop them (see illustration at right). The NCOIC would identify the carrying capacity of each HET and signal the cavalry troop commander whose vehicles were being picked up. The cavalry troop commander, who was collocated with the NCOIC, would call forward a matching tracked vehicle. The tracked vehicle then would move forward and onto the road immediately behind its designated HET. When each HET in the column reached a limit of advance (LOA) designated by the MRT, it would stop to allow another tracked vehicle to move into position behind another HET.
When the plan was put into operation, the action of successive tracked vehicles falling in behind each of the HET's resembled the locking teeth of a moving zipper; thus, the process was called "Operation Zipper." Several elements were crucial to the proper functioning of the zipper—
o Coordination at the merge point. Communication between the MRT NCOIC and the troop commander at the point where the tracked vehicles merged with the HET's was crucial. The NCOIC's knowledge of the carrying capacity of each HET enabled him to tell the troop commander which track type could be called forward next.
o Prearrangement of the tracks. The troop commander arranged his tracked
vehicles by type: M1A1 Abrams tanks in one column, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles
in the second, and M113 armored personnel carriers in the third. A platoon
leader or platoon sergeant was positioned at the head of each column. This
simplified the call-forward process by allowing the troop commander to match
a tracked vehicle to a HET with simple, prearranged visual signals.
1,300 METERS
o MRT at the LOA. Designation of a stopping point for the combined column of HET's and tracked vehicles was a movement control function. For a company-sized element of approximately 31 tracks plus 32 HET's to support their movement (one HET remained empty in case it was needed), a total road distance of about 1,300 meters was required to stage the intermixed column. The MRT was positioned on the road 1,300 meters from the merge point, where the team could stop the first HET in the column.
o Personnel transport. The track crews obviously could not ride in their tracked vehicles after the tracks were chained down on the HET's, so buses for them were provided by the movement control team.
Operation Zipper has some advantages over a standard lift operation. The linear arrangement of vehicles over a 1,300-meter stretch of land presents a more widely dispersed target than a traditional "parking lot" arrangement, so only a small fraction of the vehicles would be lost in an air strike. The zipper is easier to configure than a standard lift, since the HET's do not have to turn or alter their formation.
One disadvantage of the zipper is the difficulty of command and control for a dispersed line. Without good communications between the merge point and the LOA, safety can be jeopardized. Another disadvantage is the extra time required to complete the operation. Because the entire serial must wait until the last track at the rear of the serial is tied down, an extra 20 to 30 minutes is added to the standard 1-hour load time.
The zipper technique works best when terrain limitations, such as soft sand,
dense forest, or steep inclines, prevail. Whenever a HET unit faces such
circumstances, the unit commander might ask the supported mechanized unit
to "zip up its zipper." ALOG
First Lieutenant Anthony J. Alfidi currently is the training officer of the S3 section, 49th Transportation Center, Fort Hood, Texas. He has a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Notre Dame and has completed the Transportation Officer Basic Course and the Airborne Course.