The use of ad hoc organizations of combat service support (CSS) assets like the forward logistics element (FLE) is not new. But as the battlespace used by U.S. forces becomes less linear and the Army engages in combat with more adaptive enemies, we believe that FLE applications will only expand. We found this to be the case during the 25th Infantry Division (Light) warfighter exercise (WFX), when the use of FLEs helped to solve the challenges of the contemporary operating environment.
The WFX, like other division- or corps-level exercises, was simulated using the computerized Corps Battle Simulation (CBS); it was fought against a world-class opposing force (OPFOR), which was linked by satellite through the simulation to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and it was observed and controlled by the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).
The BCTP OPFOR has gone through a recent upgrading of capabilities and doctrine, creating what is referred to as the "contemporary operating environment." The BCTP has injected into this environment a significant amount of asymmetric capabilities, primarily built around commando companies and terrorist organizations. The conventional forces have been improved with increased tube and rocket artillery and a large amount of anti-aircraft systems. The OPFOR's artillery doctrine and capabilities no longer have the enemy deploying in regimental and divisional artillery groups. Instead, the enemy, in a way similar to U.S. doctrine, disperses his systems and uses an integrated fires center to mass fires on targets.
CBS simulates combat by calculating the variables affecting dynamic forces (in this case, the 25th Infantry Division and the OPFOR) to decide situational outcomes. The results of tactical engagements are determined using preset weapons effectiveness and force ratio (friendly to enemy forces) multipliers. Logistics operations are simulated by applying consumption factors to operational postures (such as attack or defend) and are affected by tactical outcomes.
CBS has limitations in replicating the details of real logistics operations. However, the 25th Infantry Division's successful application of support in a nonlinear environment through the use of FLEs serves as a proof of the FLE concept that other units can explore further. We have used the concepts outlined in this article with success, both here in the 25th Infantry Division during local training events and at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. What follows is a description of the division's situational concept, under the conditions we faced during the WFX. It provides one suggested method of supporting nonlinear operations in a contemporary operating environment.
The 25th Division Support Command's (DISCOM's) use of FLEs to distribute logistics capabilities across the division's battlespace enabled those assets to support maneuver operations responsively and then to preserve their capabilities through aggressive rear battle (although the distinction between deep, close, and rear operations becomes blurred on a nonlinear modern battlefield). Logistics commanders resourced the organization of FLEs and managed their capabilities based on current and future operations in order to put the appropriate logistics capabilities at tactically significant places at the right times.
Our condition set required commanders to organize and operate units at the level of the infantry battalion task force and below to offset the capabilities of a new and dynamic OPFOR willing to fight in a decentralized fashion while being distributed over a nonlinear battlespace. Through the use of FLEs, ad hoc logistics units became fully integrated members of infantry task forces, capable of maneuvering with them and sustaining tactical operations as part of their combined arms team. The factors of mission considerations, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian (METT-TC) also required commanders to shift their mindsets from providing logistics from large, tiered support bases (such as brigade, division, and logistics support areas) to task organizing logistics forward (the "support forward to the foxhole" philosophy).
During the WFX, the 25th Infantry Division fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the OPFOR. The division also fought as part of I Corps, which was located on the flank of a separate multinational coalition corps and was part of a combined joint task force.
Major General James Dubik, the division's commanding general, chose to attack with his light forces through mountainous terrain on the left and right flanks and to focus the division's attached armored brigade in the center to achieve mass effects on the enemy. To meet the corps commander's intent, he planned for his brigades to move rapidly to create two predominant effects on the decentralized enemy: deny him the ability to focus his forces and simultaneously present him with multiple problems. Working with an intent focused on its effects on the enemy, instead of an intent focused on the disposition of friendly forces, is a separation from conventional task-purpose-end state intents. Commanders and staff planned and executed operations not as members of a hierarchical organization but as a single, cohesive force focused on achieving the desired mass effects on the enemy.
The DISCOM's intelligence preparation of the battlefield indicated that the enemy's most likely (and in fact most dangerous) course of action was to let our combat forces (light infantry with attached mechanized units) pass by and then attack the "softer" CSS units, which normally follow in trail or are conducting ground resupply operations. The DISCOM commander's intent included "tucking up" FLEs with infantry battalion task forces in the restrictive mountainous terrain and using multiple modes of resupply (ground, slingload, and airdrop) to facilitate momentum and achieve maneuver logistics. Joining FLEs with the task forces provided the FLEs with mutual security while simultaneously denying the enemy lucrative logistics targets.
The FLEs carried 2 days of supply and were task organized with main support battalion (MSB) and corps support battalion (CSB) assets to generate independent logistics capabilities; in this way, the FLEs would not rely primarily on ground lines of communication (LOCs) in the nonlinear battlespace. Those 2 days of supply, along with the combat and field trains, provided 3 to 4 days of supply that were organic in the task force. This task organizing and maneuvering of CSS capabilities based on METT_TC, just like the task organizing of light infantry and mechanized forces, created new opportunities to mass logistics at the critical point on the battlefield, just as the Army has always done with artillery fires.
The DISCOM (-), with the remaining MSB and CSB assets, focused its efforts on meeting the requirements of the division's attached armored brigade, which had a more traditional array of combat and support forces. We also developed an aggressive air resupply plan using preplanned helicopter, C-130, and C-17 mass supply and Container Delivery System drops.
With FLEs integrated as full-fledged members of combined arms teams, we did not provide the enemy with any significant "soft" targets. The light brigade combat teams (BCTs) on the flanks executed their missions without any ground resupply above the forward support battalion (FSB) level for the first 4 days of the battle. We immediately established a ground LOC for the armored brigade in the center because of its significant fuel requirements. Since we initially did not have to conduct ground resupply to the 2d and 3d BCTs on the flanks, we could concentrate our ground division- and corps-level logistics movements on just the armored brigade. By the time we did have to establish a ground LOC to the 2d and 3rd BCTs, the enemy generally was retreating and on the defensive and thus was unable to mass any major ground attacks on our convoys.
The division's method of planning was as important as the plans themselves. Division, brigade, and battalion staffs used collaborative planning to simultaneously share information and develop detailed plans. During the predeployment military decisionmaking process, and, in fact, throughout the WFX, staffs and commanders used video teleconferencing in a dynamic planning process; this eliminated the need for operational pauses during incremental development of plans to travel between command posts. The staffs were able to produce multiple, multi-echeloned plans almost simultaneously across the division in a centralized environment with relevant and shared information.
This collaborative technology enhanced the process and facilitated General Dubik's effects-based intent of maintaining a high tempo with fast movement of forces throughout the operation. It put the division in the position of "winning on the offense," as Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki often says.
As an example of how the division fought and was supported, let's focus on the division's 3d BCT, which was one of the two BCTs operating in mountainous terrain on the flanks. The 3d BCT conducted the main effort for three consecutive engagements (phases)—attacking across 80 kilometers of mountainous terrain, crossing two rivers, fighting through or around four cities, air assaulting, truck assaulting, infiltrating, and completely routing the enemy 5 days, and 120 kilometers, later—and it remained combat effective on cessation of hostilities. Here is how the 3d BCT applied the FLE concept to support high-tempo operations against a contemporary enemy on challenging terrain.
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Not "The" Solution
A `Way to Think"—An Approach to a Problem
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The condition set developed for a division-level Warfighter exercise in the contemporary operating environment. |
The 3d BCT planned on attacking for approximately 2½ days through rugged, mountainous Balkan terrain, mostly on one-lane unimproved roads connected by little more than "goat trails"—in other words, light infantry country. Throughout the operation, the BCT task organized itself for movement on two separate routes that were actually a series of connecting trails. The resulting BCT formation created two parallel truck-mounted and dismounted "ranger files."
The extended files posed a problem for the FSB: it would have difficulty supporting along the route if it was posted as the trail element. (The 325th FSB supported the 3d BCT.) The solution to supporting such a long movement file was for the FSB to task organize itself and distribute an FLE to each infantry task force along the route. Distributed logistics with a direct support (DS) capability forward (drawn from FSB, MSB, and CSB assets) was needed for early sustainment of operations.
An ancillary effect of habitually associating DS capability forward with task forces was that the FSB and the brigade support area (BSA) could get as large or as small as required. Because critical capability was already embedded into the FLEs, the FSB (-) could receive a large corps push and sustain units from it rather than being forced to issue the supplies in order to move. This enabled a usually austere FSB (-) to provide area support throughout the operation to corps artillery, air defense units, engineers, and the division cavalry squadron located within the brigade sector.
Because of the challenging terrain and absence of permanent, secure LOCs in a nonlinear battlespace, the traditional use of CSBs forward and corps throughput was not practicable. The corps simply could not conduct throughput in this environment against this enemy because the roads would not handle two-way traffic and the enemy could cause significant damage to any CSS convoy moving across terrain in a noncontiguous battlefield (that is, terrain not controlled by friendly forces). The FSB (-) became a supply center, and the FLEs were its distribution elements. Successful logistics operations are all about battlefield distribution! (In the 2d BCT, we executed a similar concept, except that it required only two FLEs instead of the three needed for the 3d BCT.)
Such a task organization does not come without drawbacks. Creating multiple FSB subunits dispersed the FSBs' already austere command and control capabilities and also strained CSS capabilities. The lack of modularity in light FSBs forced commanders to make tough task-organization decisions in order to support forward. However, the benefits of using multiple FLEs vastly outweighed any friction that ensued.
With a responsive DS logistics capability forward, maneuver task force commanders (and corps units in the brigade sector) only had to look to their supporting FLEs to satisfy their requirements. Operational pauses to receive logistics packages or preplanned pushes were not required; logistics was provided over the shoulder (right there when you need it) by FLEs.
In task organizing FLEs from their FSBs, the CSS capabilities of the FLEs were as much of a concern as their proximity to maneuver task forces. Light FSBs cannot split their functional capabilities over a distance without marginalizing their limited assets; for example, a maintenance section with three soldiers and one vehicle cannot be split. Through corps and MSB augmentation and a little built-in modularity achieved through subunit organization, the FSBs task organized using the following principles—
The relationship between FLEs and the FSB (-) is symbiotic; they have a mutually beneficial coexistence. The principle strength of the FSB is its ability to provide continuous support to a BCT during sustained operations, while the strength of FLEs is their ability to be immediately responsive, flexible, and mobile. The interaction of the FSB (-) and FLEs can make both more effective.
During the WFX, the FSB (-), as the principal supply center, was able to resupply FLEs at any time. Each FLE provided DS to its dedicated task forces for all requirements. The decreased turnaround time from FSB to FLE and from FLE to task force saved hours between supply and maintenance exchanges and, when supporting combat units on the attack, maximized combat momentum. The FSB (-) or the BSA pushed supplies to FLEs on its own schedule, unrestrained by a higher resupply level's timeline.
Using the same methodology, the FSB (-) also was successful at pushing supplies that permitted rapid tactical transitions. Using anticipatory logistics, the FSB (-) built and pushed class IV barrier packages to the FLEs for transitions to defense and provided ammunition within minutes of the combat forces' needs. All of this was virtually transparent to the supported task forces.
FLEs also permitted the FSB (-) to create echelons seamlessly at times when it otherwise would have been difficult to do so. While they were on the move, FLEs established forward drop zones to receive supplies in areas that subsequently grew into BSAs when the FSB (-) arrived. FLEs also established and operated forward engineer class IV and V (ammunition) points so they could receive corps pushes or airdrops near obstacle emplacements; this was a benefit of the FLEs proximity to maneuver task forces. The creation of the forward engineer points also reduced transportation requirements and the double handling of supplies.
Another example of the way the FSB (-) provided continuous support to the task forces' requirements through the responsiveness of the FLEs was the FSB's ability to control and redirect shipments within its zone. For example, when a division cavalry forward area refuel point (FARP) was attached to a FLE, the FSB was able to redirect a corps convoy of fuel to the FARP location to fill a 10,000-gallon fuel bag.
FSB commanders also could weight the CSS main effort through task organization. As FLEs are established for mission-specific requirements, FLEs supporting identical forces do not need to be identical themselves. During the WFX, FSB commanders reorganized in conjunction with changes in BCT mission and task organization, shifted trucks among FLEs to transport personnel, and rearmed units in contact with the enemy with ammunition from other FLEs.
Throughout the operation, FLEs moved with their supported maneuver task forces. They seldom were separated from their task forces by more than 3 to 5 kilometers. FLEs sometimes were nested into battle positions with maneuver forces. Although it may seem risky to move DS assets forward, it is just as risky not to do so in a nonlinear battlespace because not moving will separate the FLE by time and distance from maneuver and security forces. Moving FLEs independently from any other force could place the FLEs at risk of taking on the full effects of a nonlinear close fight. "Tucking up" FLEs to maneuver task forces created the benefit of security through proximity.
An unintended byproduct for the FSB resulted from attaching FLEs to maneuver task forces. Because it no longer had the assets used to make three complete FLEs from an FSB, the residual FSB (-) was not a lucrative target for the enemy. The WFX after-action review indicated that the BSA was not even considered a high payoff target for the OPFOR commander like other support areas and logistics nodes. The enemy kept searching for large logistics areas with massive stocks and other logistics assets to attack, but they simply did not exist.
In another passive security measure, the FLEs and FSB (-) used main supply routes (MSRs) only when absolutely required. It was safer for these units to travel on BCT-cleared secondary routes. While the enemy searched for lucrative "soft" targets traveling on the best roads, FSB assets were moving on the secondary routes and therefore did not become targets. When the FSB (-) was required to use MSRs (for example, for receiving corps pushes), it was able to establish first-destination reporting points along the MSRs to receive pushes and provide directions to where the BSA or FLE was located.
Passive security measures for logistics air operations also were critical to the division's success. Because of difficult terrain, high operational tempo, and the asymmetric threat, the distribution of logistics was primarily through air resupply. To protect forward slingload missions in nonlinear areas, the 25th DISCOM integrated air resupply movement plans into attack aviation and air cavalry missions. Under these plans, air resupply missions receive added protection from artillery suppression of enemy air defenses and accompanying AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and OH-58 Kiowa observation helicopters. Resupply aircraft generally moved in coordination with attack aircraft in air corridors to FLE and FSB landing zones and then rejoined the attack aircraft on their return trips. Since the division's aviation assembly area was adjacent to the division support area (DSA), this coordination and linkup was virtually seamless.
On rare occasions when the FSBs were involved in direct enemy action, the dispersal of the FSB among four distinct logistics nodes (the BSA and three FLEs) and points in between helped to reduce even deliberate attacks. For example, on D+2, a FLE was destroyed in an artillery attack. Within just a few hours, the FSB commander shifted assets from the other FLEs and the FSB (-) to regenerate that FLE. Class VII (major end items) and personnel replacements were redirected to the FSB (-), which temporarily went into an amber status for some supplies until replenishment for the losses came by air from the corps and the MSB the next day.
In response to a decentralized threat and liberal bypass criteria (for example, friendly forces could bypass enemy platoon-sized elements rather than destroy them), the 3d BCT attached the brigade's DS military police platoon to the FSB and also placed all MK19 automatic grenade launchers in the brigade rear under the operational control of the FSB. In the final toll, the FSB had command and control of 18 MK19 teams for route security, counterreconnaissance, and countersurveillance and was allocated the brigade tactical combat force on several occasions. Active measures to flush out enemy special-purpose forces resulted in over 100 kills for the MK19 "company" by the end of the operation with only two friendly losses. More importantly, every ground CSS element moving among FLE locations, or between the FSB and FLEs, moved with MK19 fire power, providing the convoys with superb protection.
Here are a few suggestions for commanders and support operations officers for future operations—
Force modernization fixes could help improve the ability of light FSBs and MSBs to support combat operations on the modern battlefield. Nonlinear battlespace with an adaptive enemy demands changes from traditional organizations and operations. Changes are especially acute within 195-soldier FSBs. Force modernization changes that would enhance the FSB/FLE capability to support maneuver forces include—
Organizational and institutional improvements are important, but they are only half of the solution. Complementary operational changes in doctrine are needed to codify new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
For the 25th DISCOM, detailed and open-ended planning with effects-based intent and outcomes kept our options open, our supplies flowing, and our combat power at effective levels throughout our warfighter exercise. For this particular exercise, the employment of dedicated FLEs helped speed the division's winning of the battle and the transition from offensive to peace enforcement operations. ALOG
Colonel Raymond V. Mason is the commander of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) Division Support Command at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He recently served as special assistant to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, for Transformation. He holds a master of science degree in logistics management from the Florida Institute of Technology and a master of arts degree in national resource strategy from the National Defense University. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Major James D. Hess is the support operations officer for the 325th Forward Support Battalion at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He holds a master of science degree in logistics management from the Florida Institute of Technology and a master of military studies degree from the Marine Corps University. He is a graduate of the Army Logistics Management College's Logistics Executive Development Course and the Marine Corps Staff College.