The wartime mission of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is to provide a deep air assault behind enemy lines and establish a forward operating base (FOB). By immediately putting combat forces at the rear of the enemy, attack aircraft can stage from the FOB to engage and destroy enemy equipment and supplies at will. For the infantry battalions that secure the FOB, the key to success is defending the FOB against initial counterattacks early in the operation. Consequently, the timely delivery of class IV (construction and barrier materials) to them is critical. But there are a number of constraints that must be considered when planning class IV delivery. Likewise, there are many ways to work around those constraints. Here is one way those constraints were handled during a training rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Operating With Constraints
During an air assault, the brigade commander's primary objective is to project quickly into the fight as much of the brigade's combat power and as many combat multipliers as possible. There are thousands of personnel and hundreds of vehicles in a brigade task force. Therefore, moving a task force requires a great deal of time and precise sequencing. Yet, even after the initial air assault, a lot of combat power remains to be airlifted forward.
As a rule, helicopter pilots can fly for 8 hours in daylight and 5 hours with goggles at night. Additionally, pilots are limited to 14 hours of work a day when they fly. With the 101st Airborne Division, a typical deep air assault takes place at night at a point more than 100 kilometers away. Such an assault requires an average flying time of 105 minutes per lift, including a hot refuel (refueling from a heavy, expanded mobility, tactical truck or some other tanker without shutting down the aircraft's engine).
The infantry battalion's internal support assets should arrive on the battlefield on D-day or D-day night. Considering that each helicopter probably can make no more than three lifts during the time available and that a large volume of equipment and personnel must be brought to the FOB, the majority of the battalion's equipment probably will arrive on D+1. These assets are primarily high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWV's).
The biggest movement constraint is the fact that the heavy vehicles that are needed initially for battalion support operations are 2½-ton and heavier trucks. Transporting these vehicles by UH-60L Black Hawk and CH-47D Chinook helicopters is not feasible because of the helicopters' limited load capacities. Chinooks can lift 2½-ton trucks, but most pilots object to transporting them because of their weight and the single-point hook-up that is used. Heavy vehicles (2½ tons and above) that are moved onto the battlefield usually will be delivered by fixed-wing aircraft. A stripped 2½-ton vehicle can be transported in a C-130 transport, and a 5-ton vehicle can be flown in a C-141 (assuming that the forward landing strip can support the aircraft's weight).
Combat power is needed early in the operation, so combat vehicles not delivered during the initial air assault have priority, as do class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), class V (ammunition) for the Apache attack helicopters, and other essential supplies. After the transported vehicles are on the ground, it takes approximately five 5-ton vehicles and 50 well-coordinated man-hours to move a company's worth of class IV to various locations on D+1. Using HMMWV's to accomplish this task, although possible, is not feasible because of time constraints and personnel limitations.
Another area of concern for deep air assaults is communications. Rear battalion elements often are not able to communicate with forward battalion elements for extended periods of time. Satellite communications at brigade level are reliable but somewhat fragmented and not always available. Perhaps the most reliable communication in the 101st Airborne Division is between the 801st Main Support Battalion (MSB) and the brigade S4 or brigade assault command post using tactical satellite transmissions.
Another way of communicating is to use the helicopters returning from the forward area of operations as couriers or even establish a communications helicopter in a rear operations zone to relay messages. We must assume that communication is limited for rear battalion elements.
Since it is extremely difficult to give detailed pinpoint delivery instructions to rear area command and control elements, the best way to bring class IV into the area of operations is by sling-loading platoon packages onto a central spot on the forward landing strip using Chinooks and distributing them from that location by Black Hawks that can perform pinpoint positioning. Although specifically designed for an air assault brigade, this plan also may be useful for a light, airborne, or mechanized force.
Platoon Packages
Platoon packages of class IV supplies are critical to the operation of an FOB. A standard platoon package consists of-
2,000 sandbags.
104 wooden posts, 4 inches by 4 inches by 8 feet long.
80 steel pickets, 72 inches long.
160 steel pickets, 24 inches long.
60 rolls of concertina wire.
8 rolls of barbed wire.
25 sheets of plywood, ¾ inch by 4 feet by 8 feet long.
Completed platoon packages automatically increase mission tempo by cutting supply time. The packages are rigged and staged at the intermediate staging base (ISB). Therefore, no time is wasted in the FOB sorting through bulk class IV, configuring the material, and delivering it to platoons.
A brigade can forecast and construct the number of platoon packages it will need initially. Ideally, the platoon package plan should include one package for each infantry platoon, mortar platoon, tactical operations center, combat train command post, and field artillery battery. It is wise to increase the number of packages by 10 percent to cover any possible delivery problems. A good working number is 36 platoon packages for a two-battalion task force. More class IV will be needed for the forward logistics elements and eventually the brigade support area, but that can be brought in later by other means. The primary concern is for the infantry soldier on the ground who must defeat the initial counterattacks on the FOB.
Execution
In the ISB, a 50-man detail can construct the necessary platoon packages in 5 days. The officer or noncommissioned officer in charge must ensure that the soldiers are grouped in three teams, each charged with completing one of these construction phases: phase I (wood); phase II (wire); and phase III (rigging and placement).
The standard platoon package can be divided and rigged into three 5,000-pound-capacity cargo nets. The wood bundles prepared during phase I are staged for pickup at the division support command logpad, which, within the 101st Airborne Division, is operated by the 801st MSB. A liaison must be at the MSB tactical operations center at all times to ensure quality control.
Two 6,000-pound forklifts move the large bundles of class IV to the workers' area for breakdown and configuration. The wire bundles are built during phase II. The forklifts help compress the rolls of concertina wire so the bundles can be banded to fit into the cargo nets. The 10,000-pound forklifts move the completed packages to the staging area for rigging on the logpad during phase III.
The smaller forklifts carry the bundles to the nets and tighten the nets around the bundles by lifting each net's apex. The final packages are staged on the sides of the logpad. The cargo nets are provided by the MSB, the forward support battalion (FSB), the artillery battalion, and the infantry battalion. One hundred and eight nets are needed for 36 platoon packages. The MSB and the FSB should provide most of the nets, since the infantry battalion needs theirs for other supplies.
The nets are eventually secured to a single 25,000-pound-capacity apex with two sling legs (chains). Both sling legs should be run through all three cargo net apexes. The nets are tied together with cord to make them more secure during flight and to limit the possibility of damage to the net. The complete package weighs roughly 10,000 pounds. The loads will be delivered to the battlefield by Chinooks. If necessary, modifications can be made to the rigged packages by removing the sling legs and delivering single 5,000-pound-capacity nets by serials of Black Hawks.
The brigade S3 and S4 must establish a tentative date and time that the class IV packages should arrive on the battlefield based on the supply priorities of the operation. Updates from aircraft returning from the battlefield should give a clear picture of the operation there.
Delivery of the platoon packages should start sometime late on D-day and continue through the night and into D+1. Once a rapid refueling point is established and secured, aviation fuel, ammunition, and water are the main priorities. The next priority should be class IV.
Once the decision is made to send the platoon packages, the 801st MSB stages them on the logpad. This operation takes only 4 to 8 hours. Sling legs are attached during this operation. All deliveries go to a centralized landing zone in the FOB rather than to pre-positioned delivery points that were dictated before the air assault. This is because the dynamics of the battlefield can cause these locations to change drastically. The landing zone is near the logpad delivery landing zone and is run by the FSB. Each Chinook brings in one platoon package. (The Chinooks fly only one platoon package during training missions. However, it is possible to fly two packages [approximately 20,000 pounds] at once during wartime by attaching them to forward and center hooks.) The drops are as close as possible to each other to allow better accountability and control for the follow-on operation. The overall goal is to get the class IV forward and consolidated quickly.
The next phase of the operation requires a forward unit representative (usually the support platoon leader) to link up at the landing zone with the brigade S4. This forward representative has the necessary grids, call signs, and frequencies for pinpoint positioning. He also signs for the nets, which ensures accountability of the aerial items. The pinpoint positioning is done by Black Hawk helicopters because they are more agile and can get closer to isolated platoons. (During wartime, there may not be a suitable location near the platoon for positioning packages. In that case, the platoon can clear a landing zone, HMMWV's can bring the packages from the nearest landing zone to the platoon, or the helicopter can jettison the load as close as possible to the rear of the platoon position.) The three cargo nets that comprise the platoon package are broken down into three single loads and delivered by Black Hawks. By making three round trips, a Black Hawk helicopter can put an entire platoon package into position in as little as 30 minutes.
The final phase of the operation is recovering the cargo nets. Once the nets reach the platoon, they are quickly derigged and consolidated at a company collection point. The nets are recovered later by the supply sergeant making the next delivery and returned to the support platoon in the skeleton field trains. The support platoon leader has an accurate count of how many nets each company received. The support platoon consolidates the nets and returns them to the FSB. The time required to perform this operation should be no more than 24 hours.
Planning class IV for the FOB should consider the requirements for brigade-sized elements rather than for battalions. More than likely, battalions will have to consolidate their resources and operate initially as brigade-sized elements to allow rapid and practical delivery of class IV to the battlefield.
Class IV can be delivered on time to the front line only when planners and operators have reciprocal relationships that allow the integration of new ideas and information. If operations and logistics are not integrated at the planning and execution levels, the effort will be fragmented at best.
There are probably many ways to deliver class IV to the battlefield. The method discussed here will work, but we must not close our eyes to other possibilities. Only by experimenting, exploring other options, and examining our failures will we discover the best way to deliver critical materials to the front line on time. ALOG
Captain Paul G. V. Baker is the S3 (Air) for the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He served previously as rifle platoon leader, support platoon leader, and scout platoon leader in that division. He has a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the U.S. Military Academy.