This article expresses views of the author, not the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Swords Into Plowshares: Improving BRAC

by Colonel Stover S. James, Jr.

The military is burdened with excessive infrastructure. The base realignment and closure (BRAC) process is designed to solve the problem. But BRAC needs to be reformed to increase its effectiveness and gain popular and political support.

The process of downsizing the U.S. military and its associated infrastructure remains a daunting task for our political and military leaders. With very little fanfare, political debate, or public objection, the size of our armed forces has been reduced by nearly 50 percent since the overwhelming success of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. This downsizing was accompanied by a decrease in available Department of Defense (DOD) funding for modernization, training, housing, and military personnel benefits. Yet, while the force is smaller and defense spending is lower, the operational tempo required of the military in support of national security objectives has increased drastically in recent years.

Before the Persian Gulf War, congressional leaders passed base realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation designed to eliminate unneeded military infrastructure more efficiently and expeditiously. The first rounds of BRAC were considered by most observers to be successful and were viewed as the best way to handle the potentially painful and politicized process of reducing military infrastructure. There was, after all, much Cold War excess infrastructure from which to choose. However, as the process moved into the most recent two rounds, in 1993 and 1995, the reality of how painful BRAC can be to local communities, coupled with the possibility of negative impacts on the careers of local politicians, raised awareness and sensitivity levels to new heights. A new cottage industry evolved, specifically designed to assist communities and installations in reducing their vulnerability to BRAC.

The battle lines were drawn by the time the 1995 BRAC Commission submitted its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Then the BRAC process was complicated further when the language of the 1988 and 1990 BRAC laws was subjected to creative and flexible interpretations, most notably in the cases of two Air Force bases, Kelly in Texas and McClellan in California. The 1995 BRAC Commission recommended that both bases be closed, but the Clinton administration decided to keep them open by means of "privatization in place" (a process in which Government jobs are replaced with private, commercial contractor support). The combination of continuing fallout from the previous three rounds of BRAC and the perception that the adjustments to the 1995 commission's recommendations were politically motivated has resulted in congressional rejection of additional rounds of BRAC legislation and distrust between the Congress and the White House.

There are some valuable lessons to be learned from the previous rounds of BRAC, both good and bad. An analysis of our military infrastructure demonstrates an undeniable need for future rounds of base closings. However, simply conducting more base closures using the same procedures as in the past may not be sufficient. The BRAC process needs to be reenergized and improved through changes to the law and DOD policies in order to transform the "swords" of DOD bases and installations into the "plowshares" of economic growth for affected local communities.

Specifically, three broad areas need attention—

• Timeliness and efficiency of the implementation process.
• Scheduling and scope of BRAC rounds.
• DOD's joint cross-service group process, which focuses on gaining efficiency and harvesting savings through interservice consolidation of underutilized facilities.

It may be impossible to exclude political considerations from the BRAC process completely. But changes not only can enhance the effectiveness of BRAC, they also may increase the acceptability of the process to those communities and their representatives potentially affected by BRAC. With an improved BRAC process—one that has the confidence of contractors, local communities, local and national politicians, and the armed services—our military forces will move closer to becoming as efficient as they are competent in defending the vital interests of our Nation into the next century.

The BRAC Process

It is estimated that the four rounds of BRAC conducted so far will save DOD nearly $25 billion by the year 2003, with estimated savings exceeding $5.6 billion for every year after that. The BRAC process already has closed or realigned 152 major DOD installations and 235 smaller ones at a cost of $23 billion. BRAC is perhaps the greatest DOD cost-savings program in history.

BRAC is a very complicated process that is established by law and guided by installation closure and realignment recommendations submitted by the armed services and DOD. These recommendations are based on the National Security Strategy and mission requirements. The methodologies and criteria used to assess base structure and the recommendations of the services and DOD have worked extremely well.

The BRAC process requires each service and Defense agency to—

• Develop its recommendations based exclusively on a published force structure plan and final selection criteria.
• Consider equally all military installations located in the United States.
• Analyze its base structure using similar categories of bases.
• Use objective measures for the selection criteria wherever possible.
• Allow for military judgment to be exercised in selecting bases for closure and realignment.

The law that guided BRAC beginning in 1990 required the Secretary of Defense to base all recommendations on a 6-year force structure plan and on criteria covering a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental considerations (see chart above). Although the criteria have proved to be effective tools for identifying bases for closure and realignment, the application of the criteria arguably has been inconsistent across all of the services' analyses.

BRAC involves two distinct phases: base recommendation and selection, followed by implementation (which consists of base closure, cleanup, reuse, and disposal). Both phases include robust community and economic assistance, personnel placement, and educational programs. Each BRAC recommendation is measured against the published, Secretary of Defense-approved criteria, which give priority consideration to military value, then cost savings, and finally economic and other impacts on local communities.

The BRAC Commission's role does not come into play until after the services submit their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, who then submits his recommendations to the commission. According to the law, the commission has total access to all of the services' data, analyses, and recommendations and is required to hold public hearings. Moreover, the BRAC Commission can add bases outside of the Secretary's recommendations and can change a service's recommendations if it determines that the service secretary deviated substantially from the force structure plan or the final selection criteria.

The most recent Secretary of Defense report on BRAC (1995) found that the process had worked well "so far." Not mentioned in that report is the fact that, despite legal prohibitions, political meddling has been prevalent throughout the BRAC preparation and decision process. In fact, the political nature of the process can be seen in the selection process for BRAC Commission members: two are chosen by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two by the Senate Majority Leader, one each by the House and Senate Minority Leaders, and two by the President. Clearly, before the commission even has a chance to begin its work, the political battle lines are drawn. BRAC was designed to be objective, open, and fair. Unfortunately, it falls considerably short in objectivity and fairness, thanks to the politics involved throughout the process.

Case for BRAC

Over the past 15 years, the armed services have experienced a 40-percent decline in real spending and a 30-percent reduction in manpower. In contrast, the infrastructure needed to support today's military has declined by only 21 percent. Unless this infrastructure is reduced proportionately, the tail will swallow the teeth of our armed services. This mismatch creates the fundamental requirement for new BRAC legislation.

However, in 1998 and again in 1999, Congress rejected the Secretary of Defense's requests for additional BRAC rounds. These rounds could have provided tremendous savings for DOD, possibly adding another $21 billion in total savings through 2015. The fact that DOD infrastructure is disproportionate to the size and funding of today's, or tomorrow's, force structure is undeniable. DOD needs additional rounds of BRAC to remain affordable and effective in meeting the current National Military Strategy.

Lessons Learned

Given that BRAC is necessary in the future, some consideration to improving how it is conducted is appropriate. A thorough analysis of the four rounds of BRAC since 1988, including discussions with numerous participants in the process, reveals some significant problem areas and lessons to be learned—

• The BRAC process tends to be too long. A shorter implementation period would save money and increase effectiveness.
• Environmental cleanup issues are difficult to resolve and tremendously expensive. DOD and local communities need to negotiate cooperative agreements on environmental concerns early in the process.
• Revenues from the sale of BRAC-related property have been significantly less than anticipated and are not worth the disruption to implementation and the prolonged caretaker costs that result from the process as currently structured. Those directly affected need to become stakeholders in the outcome, particularly at the local and state levels.
• Joint cross-service groups can be extremely effective in identifying areas for major costs savings, but they have lacked sufficient time and authority to get the job done. This has resulted in the failure to realize some opportunities for joint consolidation of facilities.
• The BRAC implementation process is Government-run and is not managed by a single agency, which contributes to inefficiencies, duplication of effort, and poor auditing of costs. Privatization can lead to "win-win" situations.
• The timing of BRAC rounds makes it difficult to build congressional and political support and does not meet the services' needs for adjustments to closure and realignment plans and phased changes.

Improving BRAC

Despite its problems and shortcomings, the overwhelming majority of BRAC participants and observers agree that BRAC remains the best method for closing and realigning bases and reducing infrastructure. Closing bases always will be an extremely difficult and painful process, not only for the affected communities but also for the services. Although politics is a given in the process, and cynicism, pessimism, and flaws notwithstanding, the Congress should approve at least two more BRAC rounds in the future.

To develop more effective BRAC legislation, and to equip DOD to take better advantage of the opportunities offered by BRAC, several legal and procedural changes should be incorporated into future efforts.

Recommendation 1. The law and the corresponding regulations and policies governing BRAC should be amended to promote expeditious closures, environmental remediations, and realignments where required and appropriate.

Recommendation 2. Collection of revenues from selling BRAC lands should be terminated. A version of the Johnson-Breaux amendment should be adopted to expedite deed transfers to the affected stakeholder communities directly involved in a base closure. (The Johnson-Breaux amendment called for BRAC-related property to be offered first to the governor of the state and then to the local community at no cost before a public sale was pursued. It was withdrawn and not voted on.)

Recommendation 3. Advance cooperative agreements between DOD and affected communities concerning environmental policies, studies, and cleanup procedures should be established and executed. Specifically, the remedial investigation/feasibility study process should be accelerated. DOD should encourage the most timely methods of environmental cleanup, not the cheapest.

Recommendation 4. Once BRAC Commission recommendations are approved by Congress, all bases, regardless of service ownership, should be transferred to a single agency or contractor for closure and remediation or for realignment implementation as quickly as possible in accordance with appropriate laws and regulations.

By necessity, the armed services must retain control of an installation until the mission conducted there can be transferred. This is a complicated process that admittedly may require considerable time. However, once this stage of "operational closure" is attained, there should be an expeditious hand-off of the installation from the service to the designated agency or contractor for transition to full closure. Furthermore, the land transfer process should not be focused solely on local reuse authorities but also should include private industry. In addition, the involvement of DOD and service personnel in base closure and transition office (BCTO) activities should be reduced.

Recommendation 5. The timing of BRAC rounds should be set at one every 6 years to reduce the potential political liability of members of Congress, and each round should not require specific new legislation to commence. Each BRAC round should include a post-BRAC review so the services can adjust the implementation of previous BRAC Commission decisions to correct oversights or meet changed circumstances and execute phased infrastructure realignments, without violating the somewhat fragile integrity of the BRAC process. Furthermore, BRAC should not be limited to only two more rounds. The services need the authority to plan for and accommodate changes in the National Security Strategy, technology insertion, and real-world contingencies.

Recommendation 6. The joint cross-service group (JCSG) process should be continued, and it should be made more robust and given greater authority. The studies and findings various JCSG's made in conjunction with the 1995 BRAC round should be updated and considered for implementation. In the future, JSCG recommendations should be submitted directly to the Secretary of Defense, along with the comments of the serv-ices. A pre-BRAC interservice consolidation review panel process should be instituted ahead of each BRAC round to establish interservice cooperative agreements for consolidating work loads in depots, laboratories, test and evaluation centers, and undergraduate pilot training facilities.

In a December 1998 discussion, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated that he was concerned that Congress would not approve additional rounds of BRAC because of the perception that the pain, difficulty, and controversy of the process outweighed the potential benefits. The changes in the BRAC process that I have recommended are intended not only to increase the efficiency of the process, thereby saving millions of dollars in implementation and caretaker costs and lost opportunities for savings, but also to improve the attractiveness of BRAC to politicians and affected communities. Several BRAC officials I have spoken with feel strongly that BRAC will become most effective and beneficial for all concerned when communities with BRAC candidates volunteer their military bases for closure or realignment. The many benefits that BRAC could bring to local communities, military personnel, and DOD should not be jeopardized because of politics or a failure to appreciate DOD's infrastructure burden. ALOG

Colonel Stover S. James, Jr., is Deputy Commander of the 3d Recruiting Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He was a senior service college fellow in the national security program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University when he wrote this article. A Field Artillery officer, he is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval College of Command and Staff and holds an M.S. degree in national security studies and an M.A. degree in management.