by Major Jeffrey A. Hughes, USAR
The author believes that modern military logistics systems will continue to apply centuries-old supply techniques.
The timeless adage that history repeats itself rings true for military logistics. Two basic concepts of logistics have recurred again and again over the last five centuries, even though military logistics systems have become more and more technologically sophisticated. These two concepts, although varying in form and definition from one era to another, are supplying from within and supplying from the rear.
Supplying from within means that military forces carry what they need with them or forage the immediate area for their needs. Supplying from the rear means that military troops receive resources through supply lines from the rear. I believe that use of these two basic concepts that probably began in the 16th century is likely to continue well into the 21st century.
16th Century Logistics
In the 16th century, navies assembled great fleets of ships that applied the supplying-from-within concept of logistics. These ships carried everything the navies would need for their missions. Ammunition, food, and water had to be supplied from the outset, or crews would suffer and their mission likely would fail. In the same period, armies also used the supplying-from-within concept, but it was not as logistically developed as that of the navies. Armies used a pillage-and-plunder method to forage the areas they occupied. Soldiers exploited stores of food and fodder the locals had put aside for future use. Armies attempted to create standard supply systems, but they failed because of administrative and financial mismanagement.
Slow But Steady Change
Foraging continued in the early 17th century, but the concept of supplying from the rear emerged during that time. This concept made armies dependent on supply lines that used horse-drawn wagons or watercraft. Armies also began to develop storehouses for food and fodder and often built fortresses to guard their supply lines and storehouses.
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, forces devised more calculated ways to get what they needed from their immediate area, and pillaging and plundering became less common. One method involved paying troops more money so they could find food and fodder for themselves. Problems occurred when pay was insufficient or late or when the food supply in the area was insufficient for the number of soldiers. When that happened, soldiers again resorted to pillaging or extortion. Towns that did not produce the supplies the soldiers needed or pay them money ran the risk of being sacked and burned.
The most advanced method of obtaining supplies was the "étapes" (French for steps or stages) system, in which forces would stop at local markets at set intervals along their route and buy what they needed. This system freed soldiers from having to carry large quantities of supplies and eliminated the need for them to forage for supplies or to extort money from the local townspeople.
The French Army of Napoleon Bonaparte typified the concept of supplying from within during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. As long as Napoleon's army was moving fast, soldiers could use local resources without having to worry about resupply. However, if his army stopped, their supplies soon would be exhausted and the army would have to move to survive.
This dilemma was solved in the middle of the 19th century by using rail and river transportation. Armies did not have to move when they had used all of an area's resources, because railroads and steamboats could bring supplies to them. Prussia was the first country to use the railroad to transport supplies. By the middle of the 19th century, rail transportation had revolutionized logistics in Europe. However, the military continued to rely on horse-drawn wagons to transport supplies from the railhead to the battlefield. Thus, rails benefited armies at the onset of campaigns but were of limited use for resupplying them. Once the armies moved away from the railheads, they would outpace the horse-drawn wagons that were bringing supplies to them.
This was not the case during the Civil War. Union and Confederate armies bunched up around the railheads, and it was easier for them to centralize their battles around their umbilical cord of support than to use muscle power to move away from the railheads. The Union Army of the Potomac spent most of the war operating on either the Orange and Alexandria Railroad or the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. Sixteen railcars' worth of supplies could travel from Washington, D.C., to Alexandria, Virginia, by rail, where they then would be loaded on steamboats and shipped down the Potomac River to Aquia Creek. There, they would again be shipped by rail to the front at Falmouth, Virginia. The entire trip took only 12 hours. Shipping the supplies overland to Falmouth or Fredericksburg, which is across the Rappahannock River from Falmouth, would have required 400 to 800 wagons per day. Civil War forces chose to concentrate their energy on fighting rather than on hauling. By centralizing troops at the railheads, the armies had access to quick reinforcements, which was a tremendous advantage over an enemy that relied on wagons for support. This advantage was demonstrated in the Battle of First Bull Run in 1861, when Confederate Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard was able to foil Union Brigadier General Irvin McDowell's offensive with reinforcements brought to the front on the Manassas Gap Railroad from Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston's army.
No Turning Back
The strategic use of railroads and steamboats in the First Bull Run campaign in 1861 revolutionized the concept of supplying from the rear. Yet this advance did not come without a price: Forces now were dependent on fuels. Navies had to establish coal stations around the globe to resupply their ships. Instead of being able to let their horses graze in the field, armies had to rely on coal shipments to run their trains and steamboats. Supplying from within was no longer an option.
The technological advances of the 20th century expanded armies' capabilities to supply from the rear. The invention of motorized vehicles was a major leap forward for American and British logistics in World War I. Armies could be resupplied quickly with trucks even when they were away from railheads or steamboat depots. Oil-based fuel could be transported much more easily than coal. Although forces still depended on refineries in the rear, they did not have to maintain their forces at fuel supply points as in the Civil War. They could depend on logistics units to refuel them as they advanced on the battlefield or at sea.
While progress was being made in transportation technology, advances also were occurring in weapon systems, some of which generated new problems. New automatic weapons used massive amounts of ammunition, and tracked vehicles required continual resupply of fuel and repair parts. These developments pushed supply trucks to their limits. It also was terribly expensive to transition an entire army from horses to trucks. The European States could not produce enough trucks to supply their armies. Even as late as 1914, the German, French, and Russian Armies depended on horses for supply from the rear, which, because it was so slow, contributed to the German failures in World War I.
Ships always have been vital for transporting troops and supplies. Producing war supplies in the United States and transporting them across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was one of the greatest logistics feats accomplished during the period 1915 to 1945. In preparation for the Normandy invasion in 1944, 17 million tons of cargo and 1.6 million soldiers were shipped by the U.S. Navy to the United Kingdom. German Field Marshal Erwin J. Rommel's troops in North Africa depended completely on shipping supplies across the Mediterranean. Ammunition, fuel, food, and even water had to be transported hundreds of miles by the German Navy. Rommel's downfall occurred not only because of the lack of supplies transported across the sea, but also because these supplies could not be moved fast enough across land to keep up with his advances. Supplies piled up at the wharves while shortages occurred at the front line. Today, ships continue to carry massive loads of materials to resupply troops from the rear.
Airplanes were invented early in the 20th century, but they were not used successfully to haul supplies from the rear until the Berlin Airlift of 1948. Since that time, they have proven to be highly valuable in transporting personnel, equipment, food, ammunition, and fuel, as was demonstrated in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.
Helicopters also resupply personnel and cargo to the battlefield. They can deliver supplies to troops in remote areas because they require only a small clearing on which to land. However, due to various vehicle weights, sizes, and types of cargo, water and land transport are still critical.
What the Future Holds
As the 21st century dawns, it appears once again that history will repeat itself. Considering the Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) plans for Force XXI in 2010 and for the Objective Force in 2025, the U.S. military appears to be transitioning back to the concept of supplying from within. TRADOC recognizes that the military cannot continue to be strong for unlimited periods of time without reinforcements. Thus, its resupply plans include not only rear support bases but a reduction in bulk as well. This reduction in bulk will allow resupply by satellite-guided airfoils or pods such as the Advanced Precision Delivery System, the Guided Parafoil Air Delivery System, and the Semi-Rigid Deployable Wing. These inexpensive, unmanned platforms will be able to deliver supplies and equipment with unprecedented precision. Small, ultra-light, global positioning system-guided robotic trucks will make scheduled deliveries and pick-ups on the battlefield. Traditional supply lines will vanish.
Improvements in condensed rations, water production, maintenance, precision munitions, medical care, composite materials, engineering, and alternative energy sources will enable military forces to supply from within for extended periods of time. Condensed rations such as pellets and concentrated energy bars have been developed for soldiers to carry with them. Even more mobile are skin patches that release nutrients into soldiers' bodies at appropriate time intervals. Water will not have to be carried by the gallons over supply lines but will be a byproduct of fuel combustion engines used on the battlefields. Vehicles will have on-board purification systems and water storage tanks.
On-board prognostics and built-in programmable sensors will enable vehicle crews to determine the mechanical status of their equipment before it fails. Just-in-time replenishment will replace just-in-case stockage. Interchangeable repair parts modules will be available for use in various types of equipment to economize on the stockage of parts.
Precision munitions that enable soldiers to "fire and forget" will increase the survivability of the firing team and eliminate nearly all waste of ammunition. ("Fire and forget" means that a soldier can fire a precision round of ammunition and immediately get out of the area instead of having to stay in position and guide the round in). Software that can pinpoint targets, identify friend or foe, select appropriate ammunition and delivery systems, and accurately deliver the ammunition will dramatically reduce the quantities of ammunition required. Alternative munitions such as electric or electro-thermal guns, high-energy lasers, microwave energy, and liquid propellants eventually will eliminate the need to resupply combat forces with ammunition from the rear.
Soldier health monitors that check a soldier's physiological status, interpret the data, and guide caregivers through resuscitation and stabilization will reduce the quantity of medical supplies needed on the battlefield.
Composites will become common in the design of uniforms and tents. A single uniform will provide protection from small arms and directed energy threats, as well as from chemical and biological agents. Genetically engineered materials that instantaneously realign their molecular structure will stop the threat before it penetrates. In addition, the uniform will adjust its coloring automatically to match the environment. Likewise, shelters made of composites will provide protection from cold and heat, avert small arms and electronic threats, and guard against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. They will be made of extremely thin lightweight films with multispectral camouflage protection.
Unit laundry and decontamination will be completed in seconds by using high-energy bursts of ultraviolet or ultrasonic energy within special laundry pods.
Advances in foam technology will make it possible to spread foam over mine fields so vehicles as heavy as M1A2 Abrams tanks can drive over the mines without detonating them. Foam also will be used to build pontoon bridges on site, pave roads, and build temporary pads along airfield runways to serve as turn-out points or areas for loading or offloading aircraft.
Finally, alternative energy sources are being developed to eliminate the need for resupply of fossil fuels from the rear. Vehicles will use on-board flywheels and solar energy to complement on-board power packs. Portable power sources will use fuel-cell technologies that use oxygen and hydrogen available on the battlefield.
The Objective Force still will be supplied from within but by using highly sophisticated techniques that are very different from those of the past. The Objective Force will have the same advantages as Napoleon's forces, but it also will have the ability to maintain itself in an area as long as necessary. History will repeat itself, but not without computers, satellites, composites, and alternative energy sources. ALOG
Major Jeffrey A. Hughes, USAR, is a member of the Active Guard/Reserve and is the Deputy Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security in the 2174th Garrison Support Unit in Salem, Virginia. A Transportation Corps officer, he has a B.A. degree from the University of Kentucky and is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army Logistics Management College's Logistics Executive Development Course.